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# West Europe Report

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23 APRIL 1986

## WEST EUROPE REPORT

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POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

FRG LAENDER, LED BY STRAUSS, CRITICIZE EC POLICY REFORM

Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 13 Mar 86 p 3

[Article by Udo Bergdoll, datelined Bonn, 12 March: "Laender Rebuke for the Federal Chancellor; No 'Opposition Foreign Policy,' but More Consultation With the Laender Is Demanded"]

[Text] It is unbelievable because the story sounds so incredible: The Federal Chancellor fights for two nights in Luxembourg to achieve a modest compromise concerning the EC reform and, shortly before the signing, the Bavarian minister president asks him in Bonn to refuse his signature; from the Bavarian view, the negotiations were sloppy, the compromise of the 12 chiefs of government not only calls the purity of the beer in question, but generally also the powers of the federal Laender. The foreign minister throws the teletype message into the waste basket without having read it to the end. In the Bundesrat of the German Parliament Franz Josef Strauss on 21 February then leads a red-black coalition which, with the majority of the SPD-ruled Laender and that of Bavaria, criticizes Helmut Kohl and his cabinet for not having sufficiently consulted the Laender and for having signed the reform measure without express proviso of intrastate review.

The latest variety of the "opposition foreign policy of the Laender" reveals a constitutional problem. The fact that Strauss faults Kohl for "jellylike formulations" is only a piquancy in passing. In the matter at hand, the Laender complain that the EC reform jeopardizes their high standards as regards the law on food production and distribution and the environmental protection regulations. Therefore, the SPD-ruled Laender, too, had demanded that the reform text be signed with the proviso that the federal Laender approve it.

But the text of the treaty states: "This document requires ratification by the High Contracting Parties according to their constitutional provisions." Thus it was made clear that the Bundesrat had to give its consent before the reform can be put into effect. The wish for an express proviso therefore can only be interpreted that the Laender, under the leadership of Bavaria, lately claim foreign policy competence.

Apparently the Laender fear that, as part of the European integration process, the regional interests could be ignored, not only in Brussels but also in setting the political leeway for political compromises in Bonn. The majority

in the Bundesrat under this aspect regards the German signature of the Luxembourg compromise as disregard of the interests of the German Laender and threatens to block the ratification process.

All those who are dissatisfied with the shift of competence to Brussels and do not want to understand that the European unification process without sacrifice is not possible, found out from Strauss to whom to address their protest. The federal chancellor is the guilty one because he had promised the Laender intensive consultations but did not keep this promise. If the federal government does not want to risk a disaster on the European level, too, Helmut Kohl will have to take the tendencies in the federal Laender for greater federalist independence more seriously than heretofore. Also the intention of some Laender to set up liaison offices with the EC Commission in Brussels is not without explosive force.

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POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

SPD VISITORS TO EAST BERLIN DISCUSS BORDER, ECOLOGY ISSUES

Bonn DIE WELT in German 13 Mar 86 p 12

[Article by Georg Bauer, Kiel: "East Berlin Poses a Linkage Deal; no Border-crossing Environmental Protection Without Agreement on the Course of the Elbe Boundary"]

[Text] There will be no border-crossing environmental protection without agreement on the course of the Elbe boundary in dispute between Bonn and East Berlin. This linkage, established by "GDR" politicians, was announced yesterday by the SPD opposition leader in the Kiel Land parliament, Bjoern Engholm. Engholm, at the head of a Schleswig-Holstein SPD delegation, together with the SPD Land chairman Guenther Jansen stayed in East Berlin for three days for talks.

According to Engholm, the head of the "GDR" delegation in the German-German border commission, Volkmar Fenzlein, intimated that beyond that there is no linkage between this question and the solution of other questions.

Pawn Elbe Boundary

With the remark that the "GDR" is ready for a concession in other questions if Bonn is ready for a normalization at the Elbe boundary, Fenzlein, however, had to greatly restrict his position.

Affected by this linkage is above all the question of the redevelopment of the Elbe in which Lower Saxony and Hamburg have a special interest. Fenzlein said in connection with this point that the water resources complex had been expressly excluded from the environmental agreement between Bonn and East Berlin. This complex will not be touched until the question of the Elbe boundary, which in the opinion of East Berlin runs in the middle of the river, is not solved. In the opinion of the "GDR," no "regulation binding under international law" could be achieved on account of the resistance in Hannover. Therefore documents proving the view of the "GDR" on the course of the boundary had been forwarded to the Albrecht cabinet. Prior to that, the documents had also been submitted to the federal government.

From the talks with Politburo member Hermann Axen, it became furthermore evident that East Berlin makes the possibility of municipal partnerships dependent on certain conditions. To the Social Democrats, Axen emphasized that this is a

complicated question, since the "GDR" People's Chamber is not recognized by the CDU/CSU. This necessarily has also consequences for the establishment of municipal relations.

In the economic field, in Engholm's view East Berlin wants even closer contacts to FRG firms, for modernization of its enterprises. However, the "GDR" side had complained about the increasingly narrower interpretation of the COCOM list.

The "GDR" wants to examine whether contacts on the level of factory committees can be established, which was on the wish list of the SPD delegation.

#### More Economic Contacts

Disagreement between the partners in the talks arose concerning the "GDR" Schoenberg garbage dump at the gates of Luebeck. The SPD view that the dump could endanger in the not too distant future the safety of Luebeck and the ground water to deep into the Lauenburg area was rejected by East Berlin.

In East Berlin, Engholm had underscored the SPD view that full respecting of the citizenship in the "GDR" "in consideration of the constitutional situation of the Federal Republic of Germany" is possible and overdue. Furthermore, the SPD delegation advocated the disbanding of the Salzgitter registration office and the establishment of official relations between the "GDR" People's Chamber and the German Bundestag.

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POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

# FRG ADOPTS NEW APPROACH TO FOREIGN AID

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 20 Mar 86 p 2

[Article by Kg: "The Cabinet Approves New 'Outlines for the Developmental Policy'; Warnke: Help for Self-help; Stronger Control of Outcome Planned"]

[Text] On Wednesday the federal government approved new "outlines for the developmental policy," of which Federal Minister Warnke said after the cabinet session that they are "a result and expression of the reorientation of developmental policy." However, no change in the direction of the developmental policy is signaled. As Warnke put it, developmental policy is supposed to be help for self-help. The effectiveness of the aid is to be improved by "political dialogue" with the developing countries, by better coordination with other donor countries and by strengthening the outcome control.

Development aid is supposed to contribute to developing the creative forces of the people in the developing countries. This assumes stable legal and institutional systems with market economy elements and performance incentives, Warnke said. The responsibility for such general conditions rests with the developing countries. Their efforts could and should not be replaced by the donor countries. The federal government especially supports those countries which seek to achieve an economically efficient and balanced social order. It is part of the responsibility of the industrial countries to ensure lasting and inflation-free growth, to create the conditions for further reduction of the interest rate and to keep open and further expand the markets for products of the developing countries.

The federal government wants to concentrate its aid on the poorer developing countries. In these countries, short and medium-term survival aid must accompany long-term structural aid. Cooperation with the advanced developing countries pursues the aim to safeguard the successes and reduce imbalances in the development. The federal government wants to make a contribution to overcoming the debt crisis. It supports those debtor countries that tackle effective adjustment programs. The aid is aimed at debt rescheduling of public and publicly-guaranteed means; in addition export guarantees are to be provided. In granting aid, attention is paid to see to it that such aid also has a positive effect on employment in the FRG. A condition for granting funds has always been that projects suitable in terms of development policy were involved, Warnke said. Development aid is not only a matter of the state but also a task

of society as a whole. The federal government thus bets on the support of its aid by nonstate organizations, especially by the churches. Private economy cooperation is regarded as an indispensable contribution to the economic and social development in the developing countries. It provides, aside from capital, also entrepreneurial and technical knowledge..

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POLITICAL

FINLAND

# MAJORITY COMMUNIST, LIBERAL NEWSPAPERS ON PARTY SPLIT

## Minority Has Made 'Choice'

Helsinki KANSAN UUTiset in Finnish 20 Feb 86 p 2

[Editorial: "They Have Chosen Their Line"]

[Text] The leadership of the TIEDONANTAJA group finally came to a quick decision: it will create an organization which will be marked in the party registry. It is impossible to call this organization anything but a party. This was acknowledged yesterday by all experts.

This choice was the culmination of a long-continued conflict in which the other alternative would have been a return to organizational activity within the framework of the Communist Party and Finnish People's Democratic League. This alternative was rejected. Within the circles of the so-called organizational committees, the forces which had long prepared the way for their group to form its own party and for the organizational dissolution of the FCP and the Finnish People's Democratic League gained the upper hand. Interpretations according to which a new party would not be formed were wrong. Five thousand names are being collected for the formation of the party. A program and rules are being formulated for it. It will function as a competitor and political opponent, above all, to the Communist Party and the Finnish People's Democratic League.

The disintegrating influence of the new party must be made widely known to the laboring people, especially because in creating it, the name and symbols of the Communist Party and possibly also of the Finnish People's Democratic League are being used in a misleading manner. To the communists it goes without saying that one cannot at the same time be a member of the party and also participate in the formation of another party.

The new situation is a challenge to the Communist Party and the Finnish People's Democratic League. With the increased activism we must show that the great struggle which has been waged for 40 years after the wars for peace, democracy, the development of good relations between Finland and the Soviet Union, and the interests and rights of the laboring people continues with the leadership of the Finnish Communist Party and the Finnish People's Democratic League organizations. The activities of the competing organization lead to a separation from the people's democratic movement, splinter forces and benefit only the forces opposed to the laboring people.

SKP, CPSU Relations Examined

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 1 Mar 86 p 2

[Editorial: "SPSU and SKP"]

[Text] At the 27th meeting of the CPSU delegates, 152 foreign delegations were present. In addition to the CP and the revolutionary movements, plenty of social democratic and even non-socialist parties had been invited from some countries—as e.g. the Center Party from Finland. Only a portion could be given an opportunity to present themselves in the meeting hall itself. The Finnish Communists this time were not included in the group.

Although traditionally the SKP belongs to the important group of Western European communist parties, the chairman, Arvo Aalto, was directed to give his speech at a Moscow labor meeting. Nor was he invited to the appropriate honored position among the chairmen of the delegates meeting, where formerly room had been found for both Arne Saarinen and Taisto Sinisalo simultaneously. The message of the masters was clear—if not totally insulting: the present leadership of the SKP does not enjoy the respect of the CPSU. It could even be considered a unique form of humiliation that the party received its invitation at the very last moment. The fact that the leftists, or the so-called unity forces were left without an invitation was undoubtedly a new victory in this round for the present leadership and at the same time an indication of the CPSU's entanglement in its own SKP skein. If one holds out for a single SKP it can be represented by only one delegation. The invitation of two delegations would have been tantamount to recognition of two parties.

The new winds blowing at the meeting of the delegates forecast more tolerant attitudes toward the communist parties of different countries and toward their freedom to choose their own paths. In the case of the SKP, the CPSU has clearly reached a dead end. To get out of it, it either has to recognize the present SKP or to give its support for the creation of a new party that would please it. The latter choice should not close out the first.

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POLITICAL

GREECE

PAPANDREOU'S 'JANUS-LIKE' POLICY VIS-A-VIS UNITED STATES

Athens I VRADYNI TIS KIRIAKIS in Greek 2 Mar 86 p 12

[Article by Agamemnon Farakos]

[Excerpt] Athens--In the "Greek case" the two faces of Janus are being proved inadequate in presenting an almost unbelievable reality, created by PASOK with abundant skill, in the mesh of Greek-American relations.

One of Janus' faces is the smiling, Americanophile face of the new policy of dealing with a reality which, if ignored, would only result in disagreeable consequences, and which is complemented by an almost magical elimination of any anti-American sharpness and attack from Athens' official lips. Where did that idyllic era go, when every minister, deputy minister and sympathizer of the Papandreou government considered it his national duty to party and government to damn something American, at least once a day, from Reagan to Coca-Cola? Now, in the worst case, they keep silent, and in the best case--see the case of Georgios A. Papandreou in Washington--they "pray" together with Ronald Reagan in the White House and see to it that the Greek television immortalizes this evidence.

It is evident, though, that we are dealing with a 'line' channeled from 'above', and it is also clear that its implementation is closely watched and controlled, to avoid any 'leaks' which might alter this climate. However, it is at this point that the kind, smiling side ends. It ends exactly at the borders of the council of ministers and its members.

Deliberately and with clear political, partisan and other considerations the 'new line' of rekindling Greek-American relations is confined to these compartmentalized higher echelons and nothing, and no trace of it, leaks further down, where public opinion is really shaped, propaganda and disorientation are practiced, as they are deemed useful, to the extreme limits, down to the lowest elements of the government apparatus, where the gears of the propaganda machinery mold consciences and votes are hunted.

This decisive and very important area is controlled at all times by the anti-Americanism and the anti-American hysteria of the first four years of PASOK in government. Nothing has reached there from the 'shift' of the Papandreou government and everything continues to operate in this area as if our first and only enemy are always the Americans and one Ronald Reagan Mr Papandreou's personal adversary! The second face of Janus is not simply in the forefront in all its glory; it always controls all.



In recent weeks the U.S. air and naval 6th Fleet exercises in the central Mediterranean constituted, for the two television and radio channels on Mesogion street, "warlike actions against Colonel Qadhadhafi (that angel by whose name today's Greece swears).

The TV news reports from Washington permanently show President Reagan ready to drink the blood of the Nicaraguan people.

Any piece of news, information, rumor or whisper that insult, offend, annoy or humiliate the United States, its leaders, the structure of its society, the worsening of crime, even illiteracy, is prominently mentioned on television, radio and news agencies, very often to the detriment of other, objectively more serious and selective news.

An invitation extended by the Ellinikon American base commander to a group of mayors and community leaders, to visit the base and be shown about, was forbidden in a manner not only rude but vulgar as well by a state official, to obviously 'slap' the Americans once more.

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POLITICAL

GREECE

ND'S MITSOTAKIS SEEN SOLE MASTER OF PARTY

Athens KIRIAKATIKI ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 2 Mar 86 p 48

[Article by Panos Loukakos]

[Text] Athens--"Mitsotakis will fall within the next weeks", the leading officials of New Democracy said following the June 1985 electoral defeat. The next weeks went by and Mr Mitsotakis did not fall. "Mitsotakis will fall in October, as soon as the Chamber of Deputies opens and the deputies return from the provinces". That was the second scenario, originating from the same persons. October came and went. "Mitsotakis will fall in mid-January before the convention". This was how his inner party rivals saw it.

January went by. "We will rumple him at the convention and he will fall right afterward'. The convention is a thing of the past already, nobody 'rumpled' Mr Mitsotakis in Salenica and now, when we are in the "right afterward" period his position is stronger than at any other time, since his control within the New Democracy is now absolute.

So, Mr Mitsotakis did not fall, in spite of his rivals' numerous prognostications. On the contrary, their own plans came to naught. Today, the leader of New Democracy is all-powerful, having already annihilated Kostis Stefanopoulos and Giannis Boutos, having set aside the 'historic leadership' of the party-Messrs G. Rallis, E. Averof, K. Papakonstandinou-and having elbowed aside the younger officials who might have entertained leadership plans for the immediate future.

Now then, for the first time, Mr K. Mitsotakis can feel secure in his seat. Now, New Democracy has a leadership which might be disputable but cannot be upset. And this is the major handicap for the opposition. It is a handicap because Mr Mitsotakis may be able to win all internal party battles but he cannot win the war with the PASOK. For as long as he remains the leader of New Democracy, Mr Andreas Papandreou can sleep with tranquility at night.

This is so because always, in his juxtapositions with the current leader of the opposition party, he is and will be the unequivocal victor. Also, because it is clear that the New Democracy, led by Mr Mitsotakis, will never

win the decisive percentage of those voters vacillating between the two parties; the percentage, that is, which always yields the majority in electoral battles.

Though Mr Mitsotakis admittedly proved to be an easy opponent for Mr A. Papandreou, at the same time, all these months, he proved to be an expert in intra-party maneuvers. He took full advantage of Mr Evangelos Averof's personal bitterness for having been supplanted and was supported by the entire Averof team to dominance. And he relied on this team for support through the initial difficult times. As soon as he determined that he was rudimentally secure he proceeded to essentially dismantle the Averof team, turning its officials one against the other and cannily taking advantage of their existing personal ambitions. In this fashion, he undid those who made him the leader.

Next, Mr Mitsotakis incited Mr Stefanopoulos to a contest which he himself was controlling from the outset. Naturally he won, securing a new and unopposed election by the parliamentary team.

Right after that he proceeded to advancing and removing the new candidates to their affluence. He played his game, now with M. Evert, now with G. Varvitsiotis or A. Andrianopoulos, or anybody else appearing to have personal views. Finally, he managed to turn everyone against everyone else. Never in the past was the parliamentary team of New Democracy so deeply split and into so many pieces. Never before the ND deputies were so distrustful of each other. Never before had they been used to this extent in party games which were essentially not their own.

Mr Mitsotakis promised everybody everything. And he did not fulfill any of his promises. At the same time, he turned everyone against each other. Today, as a result, the New Democracy deputies do not even talk to each other since, frequently, whatever they have said to one of their colleagues is expeditiously passed on to their president.

Thus, during the recent intra-party elections of New Democracy for the top officials of the party, Mr Mitsotakis presented lists of his favorite candidates and managed, following a series of behind-the-scenes, albeit effective manipulations, to have almost all of them elected. Candidates, who were speaking against Mr Mitsotakis, appeared in his lists at the last minute and won election in the end. Others, who had received specific promises, are still waiting for the 'beans' which he would allegedly secure for them.

It was in this fashion Mr Mitsotakis played and won the game. Today, in dominance of the party arena, he alone decides about everything, surrounded by a close personal staff, of which a few members do not come either from the parliamentary team or from the party apparatus. These are the so called "president's men"; who, naturally, do not enjoy independent status but depend absolutely on him.

This is one side of the coin. The absolute intra-party dominance of Mr Mitsotakis. The other side is the more general policy of the New Democracy.

Here, though, the president of New Democracy has not been as successful as in the intra-party games. Because, on the one hand, the removal of all New Democracy capable officials who could possibly contest him at some point in time may be to his personal advantage; but, on the other hand, this removal completely weakens the opposition capabilities of the party.

Now, Mr Mitsotakis alone is involved in the confrontation with PASOK, without seeking help from others or refusing any help being offered. And, up to now, he has always lost. Because Mr Mitsotakis may have proved to be more capable than his ND colleagues, but surely the exact opposite is the case in his confrontation with Mr Papandreou.

Already Mr Mitsotakis is speaking of election victories in the municipal elections. And, undoubtedly, ND will neither come out the loser in these elections nor, however, will it come away with tangible political gains, since the outcome of these elections is always interpreted in many and varied ways, allowing each and everyone to maintain that he is the winner.

His opponents maintain that he will lose in these elections and they will then immediately overthrow him. This is not valid as well. Because there will not be an outcome such as to constitute a clear defeat. Also because it has been proven that, in the final analysis, Mr Mitsotakis cannot be overthrown by his existing opponents.

Thus, matters appear somehow to be predefined. And this is unfortunate. Not only for New Democracy, but for the country as well. When the New Democracy was government, and was losing ground precipitously within the electoral body, the problem was not a more general one because PASOK was in existence, constituting a viable alternative solution. Today, when it is PASOK that is involved in a descending course, Mr Mitsotakis' New Democracy, no matter how things will turn out, does not constitute for most Greeks a viable and safe prospect. And this is not New Democracy's problem alone.

13186/12828  
CSO: 3521/100

POLITICAL

GREECE

## GOVERNMENT RESHUFFLE SAID TO INCLUDE PERSONS, STRUCTURES

### Significant Changes Foreseen

Athens TA NEA in Greek 12 Mar 86 p 6

/Article by Nikiforos Antonopoulos: "Changes in Faces Too"/

/Text/ Significant changes in the policy and in the composition of the government should be expected soon, according to information given by leading officials of PASOK. Already, the extent of the changes is being prejudged in the speech of Mr Andreas Papandreou to the Central Committee that has been embodied in the policy decision of the congress and will soon be formulated in two texts:

The first text will deal with the government operation and its relationship with the political vehicles and the mass movement-a dialogue for preparing bills of a wider political and social significance, a closer relationship with the authorized guidance people of PASOK for the purpose of establishing-a concord between the selection of the priorities of the movement and the job of the government, etc.

The second will be directed to labor union officials and to corresponding organizations in PASOK that will shape the political framework within which they will move in the corresponding labor union areas in a manner that will not allow the repetition of the actions that intensified the crisis in the labor union movement last October.

As emphasized by leading officials of PASOK, with the decision of the central committee and the proposal for a dialogue to the parties of the "traditional Left", the terms are being formed for "another type of governing and a radically different approach to political and social problems".

Exactly this problem, in other words the formulation of a new political approach to problems, is the main concern of prime minister Mr Andreas Papandreou at this moment. And the final results of course will shape the changes that will be made in the composition of the government in the effort to put its new directions in practice.



"It is not possible-according to a leading official of PASOK-to change the political direction in a critical sector of the government and have someone remain in his position as minister when he promoted and applied a different political concept."

And according to current information, from confirmed sources of PASOK and the government, the changes that finally will take place will not simply be surprising, since they will include high level officials of the government whom PASOK holds deeply responsible for the policy that has been followed until now, but will also define a new political concept.

The names of the ministers are being discussed already in political circles, the ones who according to appraisal of the leading officials of PASOK cannot support a new political concept, either because they themselves have been connected with "old party views", or because their public attitude is not consistent with the position of a minister of a socialist government, or because with their political attitude they have created "polarizations with a hardening of positions"-as indicated by the prime minister himself when he was closing the meeting of the central committee-that do not permit a dialogue to get out of the crisis that already has permeated the social level.

Of course, these are the directions that now are being followed by the PASOK leadership, members of which believe the time of these changes will take place between April and May.

To what extent-and when exactly- these changes will take place is up to Mr Papandreu who has also to weigh in appraisal both the general political framework as it will evolve in view of the dialogue that he is proposing with the parties of the Left, and the developments that will occur in our national affairs, after the forthcoming visits of the ministers of foreign affairs of the U.S., Mr Shultz, of Britain, Mr Howe, and the general secretary of NATO, Mr Carrington.

Beyond the changes that are expected at the government level, however, important changes are being pursued affecting all PASOK functionaries at the local and nomarch levels.

This is a procedure that will have been completed by the end of April and that is tied both with the election of officers that will be conducted within almost all of the bodies of the masses as well as with the thorough preparation of PASOK for the municipal electoral battle that is considered to be of decisive value to PASOK-and certainly, to a great degree, to the government itself.

### Personalities Reportedly Involved

Athens I VRADYNI TIS KYRIAKIS in Greek 16 Mar 86 p 3

/Text/ A deep incision in the government with the removal of a large number of ministers and deputy ministers and the appointment of new ones is being arranged methodically by Mr A. Papandreou, shortly after Shultz' visit to Athens and without fail before Easter, according to well informed circles of PASOK that say: the reconstruction will be very wide.

These changes of people will be "balancing" changes of the new navigation course that Mr Papandreou imposed since the summer of 1982, not only on matters of a financial nature, but also of a political and especially foreign policy nature-a policy that has aroused many officials of the Movement, first of all the labor union officials who describe this as a "right turn".

This balancing-as it is described-will be pursued with an "inside turning" left opening of the government that seeks to diminish the impressions and the exaggerations of the last four months, reactions of the left wing of PASOK to the so-called "outside turning" "right" opening.

But the reconstruction has been designed to service the need of PASOK in going to the municipal elections. And from this point of view it is destined to service party interests. Consequently, it will be adjusted both in strategy and tactics to be followed by the Movement in the municipal elections. And because the strategy and tactics of PASOK are based on the creation of a wider alliance of the leftist forces, the "new" person of the government will be leftist on this criterion. And yet, to complete the adjustment of government personnel in view of the municipal elections, it is understandable that the new government will include one or two persons who come from the wider center left area, such as Mr Adam. Pepelasis who does not come from PASOK.

Political observers say that if the reconstruction is going to be of any use to the needs for the municipal elections, for one thing, it must take place at least six months ahead of them. If it is to accomodate the need to confront the leftist uprising within PASOK, for another thing, whose flag was raised by Mr Arsenis Friday, it must be done now, before the "rebels"(dropped labor union officials and dissatisfied leftist officials of PASOK) have a chance to act.

### Who is Leaving

According to information from the same sources, the following ministers are considered to be among those who will be removed by the government: G. Mangakis (Justice) because of a statement he made concerning Mr Papakarya that committed the government. A. Drosogiannis (substitute National Defense) for reasons of health. N. Akritidis (Commerce) for his policy and for rents and prices. G. Papadimitriou (Transportation-Communications) is blamed for the failure in the "Olympic Air Force" and in the strike of the truckers. G. Moraitis (substitute minister of Agriculture) is blamed for the arousal of the farmers. In addition, for various reasons, mainly because of poor performance, the following deputy ministers are being replaced: Sekhiotis (Defense), Papaioannou (as a government representative), Roumeliotis (National Economy), Kakiamanakis (Health-Welfare), Katsifaras (Commerce), Moralis (Education), and Athanasopoulos (Finance).

### Who is Coming In

It is believed that the following will be coming into the government: Messrs A. Tritsis (minister of Transportation), V. Kedikoglou (Commerce), I. Degianis (Justice), I. Skoularikis (substitute Agriculture), D. Pagoropoulos (deputy minister of Defense), D. Maroudas (deputy minister Press), D. Rokos (deputy minister Education), G. Ktenas (deputy minister Health), S. Anastasakos (Commerce), G. Skandalidis (Finance), and St. Tzoumakos.

The position of substitute minister of National Defense probably is being occupied by Mr Io. Kharalambopoulos who occupies the vice presidency of the government.

Some deputy ministers are believed to be candidates, Mr Georgios Papandreou being one of the first, by being promoted to the position of deputy minister of Foreign Affairs with certain jurisdiction and a specific mission.

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CSO: 3521/112

POLITICAL

GREECE

# CHANCES OF ARSENIS-KKE (INT) COOPERATION WEIGHED

Athens TA NEA in Greek 9 Mar 86 p 10

/Article by Pantelis KAPSIS: "G. Arsenis, PASOK, and the Left"/

/Text/ The open proposal for cooperation made from Salonica by the president of the KKE (Interior), Mr Leonidas Kyrkos to Mr Gerasimos Arsenis, just two days after his removal, substantially passed unnoticed.

And it is true that the possibilities of such cooperation, at least for the near future, are minimal.

The two sides have substantial political differences, the most important being their concept of the EEC. The KKE (Interior) supported joining it, and at the present time, it continues to believe that our participation in the community, despite certain disadvantages, is financially necessary and politically beneficial.

To the contrary, Mr G. Arsenis, for a long time-when he was still a minister-has expressed the view that joining the EEC has negative results. Indeed, recently he started to talk about the "ideological imperialism" of Brussels.

In addition to this differences, however, the cooperation-in the sense of an organizational unity of course, and not of a common stance on specific problems-is hindered by the declared intention of Mr Arsenis to remain independent for a long period of time.

And because he believes that it is premature for him to make binding decisions immediately after the "surprise attack" of his removal, and also because he considers his area of reference as having been and still being PASOK. In this sense, he is willing to adopt a tactic of waiting, hoping that the friction in PASOK will continue and that he himself will become a pole attracting the dissatisfied followers and officials.

Of course, he is not the only one that is hoping for something like this. Similar views are shared by the removed labor union officials of PASOK who, at least for the time being, appear to be hesitant as to whether or not they should proceed toward the creation of a pure political movement.

Their relationship with Mr Arsenis still remain unclarified. It is known that in the past, many of them clashed with him. Since, however, the time that the two sides found themselves in the intraparty opposition, their relationship improved substantially.

#### Distrust

Some kind of mutual distrust remains, however, and it is not at all certain that their political evaluations coincide.

Perhaps their natural persistence in some demands of a narrow labor union character very probably will find Mr Arsenis opposed, while reference to 3 Sept in itself, no matter how useful it is ideologically, surely is not sufficient at the present time to justify the stigma of a political movement.

Therefore, the probability of this cooperation should be considered exceptionally doubtful.

It is certain, however, that both of the communist parties would like to have the dissatisfied followers of PASOK express themselves.

#### The KKE

Already since the June elections, the KKE had provided "shelter" to a number of former deputies of PASOK who participated in their lists as cooperative.

With its present proposal for unity of the Left, the KKE is taking one more important step that without fail, in addition to the KKE (Interior), has as a target the former officials and followers of PASOK. With these officials, indeed in view of the forthcoming municipal elections, it hopes to establish more permanent ties of political cooperation.

On the part of the KKE (Interior), it appears to be on the verge of a big decision: changing its title and its "post-development" into a wider left-socialist vehicle.

It is certain that this decision was definitely affected by the will of the leadership of the KKE (Interior) to express the powers that-it believes-will be released by PASOK.



POLITICAL

GREECE

ALTERNATIVE LOCATION ADVOCATED FOR TRUMAN STATUE

Athens ELEVTHEROTIPIA in Greek 26 Mar 86 p 8

[Text] WHEREAS the bombing of Harry Truman's statue is now a fact, regardless of our opinion that we do not approve of any kind of dynamiting activity which endangers the life of civilians....

WHEREAS this particular statue has become the target of such actions in the past, endangering the safety of the neighborhood, as when we lamented the loss of one human life in a previous attempt....

WHEREAS even his own countrymen did not honor with a statue the president who has become identified with the Hiroshima and Nagasaki catastrophes....

WHEREAS the implementation of the Truman doctrine and the economic assistance it brought about did not lead Turkey--which profited equally from it--to such slavish awarding of honors as we did right here, by building a statue of Truman while he was still alive....

WHEREAS in the Greek ambiance Truman's name is tied to the worst period in Greek-American relations, the period of the civil war and the post-civil war "Americanocracy"....

WHEREAS it would be improvident to erect the statue in the same place to be an open invitation to potential terrorists and a permanent source of concern for the people who live in the area or simply pass by....

WHEREAS the statue stands right next to the Athens Conservatory, where thousands of children attend classes every day, while other children in the neighborhood play in the same square....

WHEREAS very few believe today that to erect a statue to a specific president of the United States while he is still alive was not an act denoting subordination....

WHEREAS nowadays the flag of national independence and national pride, which surely is not compatible with...adoring expressions vis-a-vis any leader of a foreign power--especially the one which always pursued suzerainty and "clientelism"....

THEREFORE, now that the statue in question is no longer standing, no matter what were the actions that led to it, there should be no attempt to erect it on the same spot. If the U.S. Embassy is willing, it should house it in its garden, which is quite large and extremely secure....

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POLITICAL

GREECE

BRIEFS

ND GAINS IN WARD COUNCILS--Athens--ND triumphed in yesterday's ward council elections in Palai Faliro. It placed first, with a considerable difference in votes from second-runner PASOK, while at the same time increasing its percentage by 5 percentage points with respect to last year, gathering 48 percent of the votes. More specifically in 13,668 valid ballots it received 6,532 votes; PASOK received 4,235 or 31 percent, KKE 2,364 or 17 percent, and KKE (int) 537 or 4 percent. ND triumphed also in the Khandia ward council elections. Specifically ND received 34.6 percent and 39 seats, up from 26.15 percent and 30 seats in the last elections. PASOK received 39 percent and 42 seats, down from 41.1 percent and 44 seats. The collaborating KKE and Liberal parties received 26.4 percent and 24 seats, down from the 1984 31.67 percent and 39 seats. [Text] [Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 3 Mar 86 p 7] 13186/12828

CSO: 3521/100

POLITICAL

ICELAND

PAPER EXAMINES UNION OF SOCIALISTS NEW CHAIRMAN

Reykjavik HELGARPOSTURINN in Icelandic 12 Dec 85 pp 26-27

[Article by Sigmund Erni Runarsson: "Gudmundur Einarsson"]

MP Gudmundur Einarsson was elected chairman of the Social Democratic Alliance at the party's national convention held last weekend. The meeting was attended by around 50 persons. Einarsson has become chairman of a party in difficulty. Its following has declined by a fourth from its greatest following according to the last HELGARPOSTURINN Poll. In the close up portrait of this active opponent of the system following there is an examination both Einarsson's political competence and leadership abilities.

[Text] Gudmundur Einarsson is a scorpio. He was born on the 5th of November [1948] in Reykjavik. His parents were Johanna Lara Palsdottir, housewife, and Einar Gudmundsson, clerk with the Icelandic Petroleum Company until last autumn when he retired from his post. His kinfolk on his father's side were from Borgarfjordur and Strond, more specifically, from Munadarnes in Arneshreppur. His kinfolk on his mother's side were from Skaftafellsslysia, especially Svinafell. Gudmundur Einarsson in fact spent a number of summers at the large family farm in Svinafell when he was around confirmation age. Gudmundur was the eldest of three children of his parents.

In 1950, when Gudmundur was three years old, his family moved away from the thickly populated area, as Gudmundur himself has worded it. But the move was an extremely short one, to Kopavogur. The city was, however, at that time only comprised of a few isolated houses, compared to what it became later. Gudmundur Einarsson lived in Kopavogur until 1983, the same year that he became a nationally elected MP from Reykjanes, when he moved from his electoral district to the capital and began to build his own family house. He was happy, however, with his new residence since it is situated so far up into Breidholtinn that he can reach his Reykjanes voters in a few minutes. He thinks that his house is only a hundred meters or so from the boundaries of his electoral district.

Gudmundur never presented any problems as a child. He was thought an especially quiet child. His mother said that there was never any need to discipline him. His mother added: "He was not exactly a shy child, but rather reserved and circumspect. He could be trusted completely. I could believe in

what he said and did. He was also very obedient as a child. And then there was his interest in books...." She said that her son had learned to read by the age of six and became somewhat of an avid reader. He likewise did very well in school.

Gudmundur and Gudny Gudmundsdottir, now concert master of the Symphony Orchestra, shared the highest marks during all of their school years through the national examinations. Gudny Gudmundsdottir said that she remembered her competitor as a very quiet and serious young man who never took any part in rowdy school activities. Magnus Larusson, a farmer in Svinafell, also remembered Gudmundur as a quiet boy. "He was, however, no sissy and never nervous to any degree. He worked systematically and was good with his hands in an above average manner."

Jon Bragi Bjarnason came to know Gudmundur in the seventh grade and they have been friends ever since. Bjarnason said that his shyness had gradually left Gudmundur as he came almost to the end of his youthful years. It was too hard for him that way. But his gifts became more noticeable. As Bjarnason has said, Gudmundur was a highly exceptional leading student in high school to the degree that he was simultaneously very forward in social life. Fate determined that he always played a major role in the fun going on at school but the young Gudmundur always had a very clear conception of things and had god given talents."

It did not occur to Gudmundur to become an athlete or to compete in sports. Nevertheless, he made two good attempts in this area. On the one hand he went out for football practice, but the coach could find nothing better to do with him than to make him a guard. Gudmundur discovered that this was no fun. On the other hand, he did make an effort at track and field and was forthwith sent out to into the ring to cast shot. Gudmundur had a marvelous build during these years of youth, was never really corpulent and was skinny as a bone. But his interests lay in other areas besides sports.

Gudmundur took up the guitar. Halldor Fannar, a Reykjavik dentist and one of Gudmundur's school chums, once proposed to Gudmundur that they form a country music band. Since neither of them knew anything about performing music, other than four guitar arrangements that Gudmundur was prepared to teach, they brought Olafur Thordarson in with them as a kind of leader of the group which soon received the name 'Rokkarnir.' When Jon Bragi Bjarnason joined the group it was also called Kvidagilskvartettinn, when the occasion called for it. Halldor Fannar remembers that Gudmundur used to have a great deal of fun at it. "What do you know. I was there one time when he was really carrying on. He was a sly dog. But at the same time he was very convivial and honest."

No more was needed than to have Gudmundur and Jon Bragi leave the group and for Helgi Petursson to replace them for it to become nationally famous. After Jon Bragi Bjarnason and Gudmundur Einarsson passed their national exams, the name of the group was changed to 'Rio Trio' and people began to imitate it. On the other hand, very little was heard from Gudmundur Einarsson during his stay in the Reykjavik Secondary Grammar School. The Reykjavik Secondary Grammar School was at the time the only such school in the capital region and there congregated in it all factions from the entire region. There was a group of



local people from Kopavogur, for example. Jon Bragi Bjarnason was Gudmundur's best friend but among Gudmundur's school mates in the Mathematics Department of the Reykjavik Secondary Grammar School were Gestur Thorgeirsson, cardiac doctor, Ragnar Steinsson, dentist, Thor Steinarsson, secondary grammar school teacher, and Kristinn Magnusson, civil engineer.

Gudmundur first became very conspicuous in life at the Reykjavik Secondary Grammar School when he entered the school's highest grade, the seventh. He was, among other things, chosen a member of his class council. Serving with him on the council were, for example, doctors Sigurdur Gudmundsson, Ottar Gudmundsson and Magnus Jonasson. That which catapulted Gudmundur to stardom was his participation in seniors night that year of his education. Erlingur Gislason directed the Beggars' Opera and there was no choice but to choose Gudmundur for the title role of the complicated work of John Gay. Gudmundur was brilliant as Mack the Knife. His interpretation of the role was thought to be exceptionally good for a beginner. He sang and danced on the stage like a seasoned performer. The opera was performed at the National Play House and was especially well attended for a school play.

Gudmundur was very popular at school after that. His self-confidence rose correspondingly. It thus happened that no school party could take place without the good fun that Gudmundur came to represent for students. He became a real lady's man but Halldor Fannar claims that the girls were more interested in his character than his appearance. His appearance was nothing special compared to others. However, he radiated something, according to women we contacted for the portrait. Steinunn Sigurdardottir remembered him for example as a party-goer: "Gudmundur was the life of the party in every sense of the word. I think that the term was invented with him in mind. He was at least the center of everything whenever people had a good time..."

Gudmundur's abilities as guitarist helped considerably in this; also his voice: "He had a deep and masculine voice which sounded good to people," said Jon Asbergsson, director of Hagkaupa. He and Gudmundur were close friends during all their years at the secondary grammar school. "Gudmundur became an enormously good fun lover. He was well qualified to be so," added Jon Asbergsson. "I remember how Vilmundur Gylfason nominated Gudmundur as most talented musician of the 7th class," noted Logi Jonsson, reader. He was Gudmundur's fellow student in the Reykjavik Secondary Grammar School. In fact, Gudmundur was never called anything other than Gvendur the spinner during his last year at the school. "He sang 'Sixteen Tons' better than Tennessee Ernie Ford himself," recalled Einar Thoroddsen, teacher, who was in the same class as Gudmundur. "We heard him sing all the time to the same melody: 'the two of us pass along, the two of us pass along in the twilight.' Thus the life of the party was in high spirits," Logi Jonsson recalled. Jon Asbergsson also noted that Gudmundur very often played and sang adaptations of Kris Kristoffersson during these good old parties. "And they harmonized their voices very closely with one another."

The influence achieved by Gudmundur's voice is no better indicated than in the following story of Jon Bragi Bjarnason: "I introduced Gudmundur to Vimmi, when he was school inspector. They quickly became fast friends. It was one Friday evening after that when Vimmi and I were at Gudmundur's house on Aragata and

did not know what to do with ourselves. We decided to pour a little into our glasses and to enjoy ourselves properly we resolved to call upon Gudmundur Einarsson to begin a concert with us. At about our 17th song the educational counselor looked in on us. He had just returned from a visit to a lady and only told us to keep singing if we wanted to. We do so, bade Gylfi good night and continued singing and drinking. This was in spite of the fact that the next day was a school day. We finally halted about 7:00 and went in misery to school. But what Vimmi heard from his father later that night was no scolding for what had happened: "Who was the wonderful bass voice singing with you all night my Vilmundur?"

Gudmundur graduated from the Reykjavik Secondary Grammar School with highest honors determined to become a doctor, just like a great many other of his fellow students from the school in fact did. But in the end he became bored with this choice of an occupation and Gudmundur decided to study biology, which had just begun to be taught in the Haskoli, instead. He has said that he quickly became fascinated by the subject, although he has not the slightest idea of the source of his interest in biology. Gudmundur passed his BS examinations in biology in 1973 and students that were at the Haskoli at the same time that he was say that the period was little eventful for him. The most important thing for him was his participation in the environmental movement, founded in the Haskoli at the beginning of the 1970s. This was his first political activity.

Gudmundur's graduate education in biology had some connection with the study of nervous systems, experimental methodology and psychology. He undertook his graduate work in the University of Birmingham. He gained his master's degree after 12 months of difficult study. He returned to Iceland in 1976 after having participated in a substantial amount of biological research in Birmingham. Johann Axelsson, professor in the Haskoli Research Institute tried to rope in Gudmundur. Axelsson had gotten to know Gudmundur when he had studied in the research institute for a winter after just completing his BS degree. In the spring of 1974, Gudmundur had taken Drofn Olafsdottir, daughter of Olafur Olafsson, a Reykjavik merchant, and Sigrun Eythorsdottir as his wife. Gudmundur Einarsson and Drofn Olafsdottir, who was brought up by foster parents, have one daughter, Olofa. She will be seventeen this year a week from Friday.

Johann Axelsson feels that the best thing that ever happened to the institute that he heads is having gotten Gudmundur Einarsson: "If being a good man has any meaning any longer in Iceland then Gudmundur is such a man. He is a person of the highest quality." Logi Jonsson, who worked with Gudmundur at the Research Institute, said that Gudmundur is above all a good scientist and a careful scholar. He does everything very carefully, puts everything down on paper and for this reason it is very easy to follow up on his work or to work with him. He is quick to grasp the essentials of what he is doing and it is among other things because of this that he is a fine teacher with a good reputation.

Students say that he is a very lively teacher, is clear and circumspect in his teaching and his exposition of fact is particularly clear. Johann Axelsson says: "Gudmundur has the fine ability of simplifying things without

oversimplifying them. Lektor Jon Bragi Bjarnason recalls a time when he saw Gudmundur teaching a class of 100. "It was an amusing sight. Gudmundur's body twitched, his long legs akimbo. He was to be sure only in shirt sleeves and that was unbuttoned and had begun to sweat slightly. The knot of his tie had fallen to the middle of his chest."

The specialty of Gudmundur in biology is the ability of fish to hear and see. To the same degree that he is unaware of where his interest in biology came from so he is unable to say why he choose that specialty within the discipline of biology. But he enjoys it, "it's crazy," he says and dwells on the sound of the word. Johann Axelsson says that Gudmundur's capacity for work is enormous and for this reason he has had, for example, very good results in his research on his own. "You know, you can rely upon Gudmundur to do his job," continued Johann Axelsson. "I feel rather guilty about the way that I have piled work on him since I knew that he could be relied upon to do it. The professor added: "We miss him very much."

It was very unexpected when Gudmundur Einarsson stood for election for the Social Democratic Alliance during the 1983 elections and those surprised included his closest friends and associates. They did not know Gudmundur Einarsson the politician. Jon Bragi Bjarnason says: "Vilmundur wanted to ally Gudmundur with himself since he had enormous respect for Gudmundur Einarsson the man. He asked me to talk to Gvendur, which I did. Gudmundur was not entirely willing at first, but said that he would think the matter over. His wife, Drofn Olafsdottir, said that she had thought the idea very serious and little interesting at first. "Later, when Gudmundur decided to run, the first thing that occurred to me was a certain alarm and dread. I just could not imagine what influence Gudmundur's serving in the Althing would have on our family life."

Gudmundur's friends say that he has not changed since becoming an MP. Bjarnason thinks, however, that he has become a little more serious. But it does not slow him down by any means. Nothing limits him for example when he takes his guitar in hand. "Kristoffersson still bursts forth from him when he is surrounded by good friends, with always the same familiarity and enthusiasm," said Jon Asbergsson, who, like other close friends of Gudmundur, were amazed by his running for the Althing. Asbergsson, on the other hand, said that as an Independence Party man he is particularly happy with what his friend's leadership in the Austurvöllur:

"I have been in agreement with him in many areas," he said. "It should not be forgotten when discussing the political knowledge of Gudmundur Einarsson that he has come to the Althing completely without preconceptions. He is uncorrupted. I find him to be very sincere in his challenge to the system." Jon Bragi Bjarnason said that he could agree with calling Gudmundur Einarsson sincere but said that also characteristic of Einarsson as a politician is that he advances his cause with great adroitness and clarity.

Stefan Benediktsson also emphasizes this characteristic of Einarsson. "In spite of how few of us there are in the Althing, I think that none of our opponents can deny the fact that Gudmundur Einarsson is a political heavyweight. This is due, among other things, to his good ability to see the



right thing and to make distinctions. For this reason people listen better to him than others." Stefan Benediktsson added: "This is his innate quality and at the same time something that he has learned." Johann Axelsson also thinks that this is something which he has learned: "Gudmundur's scholarly training, it seems to me, has been of much use of him in the Althing. He has a discipline of thought that helps him to ask the right questions."

Jon Baldvin Hannibalsson says that he has encountered the scholar in Einarsson in the halls of the Althing. For example, his analogies are often drawn from biology. Still other politicians assert that rationalism and a scholarly way of thinking could accommodate themselves very well to the Althing business--although the situation is normally the opposite. But it is a conspicuous and in the view of some overwhelming part of Einarsson's modus operandi that his education should hinder him as a politician. In the words of one Social Democratic Alliance man: "He is a political rebel and in fact is sick of politics. His training as a bacteriologist have made him all too patient and given him the will to compromise that has, among other things, found expression in his willingness to settle for compromise even though success is not achieved thereby."

Another Social Democratic Alliance man said that he missed decisiveness in Gudmundur's way of operating and that his difficulty in making decisions harms him. This is something that has hurt the party. The man said: "Gudmundur Einarsson is extremely discerning and would be very good at controlling a 20-man Althing delegation. A small party such as the Social Democratic Alliance, on the other hand, needs another kind of MP--and I am saying nothing about Gudmundur as party chairman--than Gudmundur Einarsson to hold its ground. People simply must be different in a four-man Althing delegation which wishes to be different. Members of such a delegation should be cooler and more decisive. Gudmundur's refrain, for example, when matters are taken up is too often: "There is another side to the issue!"

"The man needs always to have a complete understanding of issues. The Social Democratic Alliance cannot afford a person so careful and conscientious as Gudmundur Einarsson," the same source continued. "He is not the type that a revolutionary party needs. This is clear from how he behaves in the Althing. This has the following results: When the results of the last poll carried out by HELGARPOSTURINN on party following were issued, and it became clear what a loss the Social Democratic Alliance had suffered, a wave of sympathy swept through the Althing. If the Social Democratic Alliance had successfully advanced its cause, there would have been applause in the chambers of the Althing when the news was announced. People are shocked at the prospect of preparing to get rid of that plague at the middle of the system, the Althing."

Gudmundur Einarsson's politics center first and foremost on a change in the political system which he thinks a precondition for better living conditions. He brought this view into the Social Democratic Alliance after the Alliance of Liberals and Leftists fell out of the picture. In the quarrels this summer about what points the party ought to emphasize, Gudmundur Einarsson stood isolated among his opponents. He choose to attempt to maintain the unity of the party, something which many of those still in the party blame him for. They wanted the then head of the party Althing delegation, Gudmundur

Einarsson, to cut the matter short and pack the opposition off back where they came from, "which is naturally nothing more than a party of four."

Many of Gudmundur's allies do not deny that they think that what he achieved this summer was little more than appearance, a good show job. Gudmundur Einarsson's forbearance greatly damaged the Social Democratic Alliance this summer," asserted one party protagonist. Gudmundur Einarsson responds to such a statement by saying that he did not use the power of the national convention to make trouble. He was only chosen by three persons as party Althing delegation chairman. He also notes that one of the most important things for him in regard to the Social Democratic Alliance is the principle that no one should go around with a whip and round up an army.

So it seems that in recent weeks just the man has been chosen for the task. Many are very much opposed to the way in which Einarsson proposes to lead the Social Democratic Alliance. Many of his colleagues from the sciences and likewise from politics praise his political abilities and lay great emphasis on the fact that good things are to be expected from him. Members of the Social Democratic Alliance note, on the other hand, emphasize that it is good to work side by side with Gudmundur Einarsson, but not under him to the degree that he is good at monopolizing things, at preventing others from doing what they like. Still others think it impossible for one person to have as much "patient attention to small detail" as Gudmundur Einarsson and fear that people will not be able to work well with him. "Gudmundur Einarsson is a too much a liberal, I think. He is not the type of keep his resolutions over the long term and never without making things complicated. Stefan Benediktsson is, on the other hand, very much the prima donna. Gudmundur Einarsson was chosen chairman as one of two bad choices: people could not take the risk of electing Benediktsson again. But it is absolutely true that Einarsson will discuss matters with people before coming to a decision."

Jon Baldvin Hannibalsson said that if it is true that Gudmundur Einarsson lacks toughness then nothing much can be expected of him as chairman. "Toughness is expected in party chairmen," as a Social Democratic Party man worded it. Stefan Benediktsson said, on the other hand, that he had no concerns whatever that Einarsson will be able to do what has to be done. "The only concern that I have with regard to Einarsson as chairman is that he will try to do too much of the work himself. Few men realize what a great workhorse he is." Olafur Ragnar Grimsson: "Gudmundur Einarsson has taken upon himself the task of making changes in the political system popular in Iceland, changes which Vilmundur Gylfason, one of the greatest agitators ever produced by Iceland, was unable to achieve except in small ways. For this reason I have no confidence that Einarsson will be successful, in spite of his many virtues, of giving the Social Democratic Alliance the power that it will need to be anything more than a minor party in the future."

When Gudmundur Einarsson comes home he wants to discuss anything but politics. His friends--besides Jon Bragi Bjarnason and Jon Asbergsson, mentioned above, we may mention Fridrik Palsson, with The Sales Headquarters for Icelandic Freezer Plants, and lawyer Hallgrimur Geirsson--say that he is certainly shocked by things that come up in their conversations which he finds unjust but that he is not naive. He retains his sense of humor in the face of



everything. Gudmundur Einarsson is a fighter in his way but no miracle man. There is rather a great deal in his sense of humor which tends to fix on little things in his environment. His wife, Drofn Olafsdottir, agrees with this. She tells the following story that she feels is typical of her husband. "We decided once to take up skiing. The next day Gudmundur did not just rush out to the nearest sportswear store and buy equipment. No, he first went to the bookstore and purchased various books on the history of ski sporting, ski instruction and training and likewise books on what lubricants are best under various conditions. We first went skiing after he had read it all in preparation."

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POLITICAL

ICELAND

SVAVAR GESTSSON FINDS PEOPLE'S ALLIANCE CHAIRMANSHIP DIFFICULT

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 21 Dec 85 p 9

[Commentary by Staksteinar: "Struggle in the People's Alliance"]

[Text] Svavar Gestsson was reelected party chairman at the last national convention of the People's Alliance Party. Events of recent days, however have shown that he is no longer the leader of the party. This week he suffered defeats in votes within the party executive committee and within the party Althing delegation and further news about the power struggle within the party is expected. Olafur Ragnar Grimsson and Ragnar Arnalds seem determined to see to it that the party chairman not be able to find out what his real position within the party is.

Resolved by the Party Executive Committee

The People's Alliance Party Executive Committee, chaired by Olafur Ragnar Grimsson, made a resolution on Monday concerning the bank council issue, something that has caused great disquiet within the party. There were three articles in the resolution of interest here. First of all, it was stated that it would be improper for the departing council of the Credit Bank to be reelected. The entire council should be replaced. Secondly, the primary rule is established that the party Althing delegation should not nominate individuals for the bank council of the Icelandic State Bank. It is added that this rule will be put into force gradually and that members of the party presently on bank councils from the Althing group will be subject or not subject to the new rule on reelection as they desire. Finally, there was in the resolution of the party Executive Committee a new interpretation of the laws on bank privacy. The view of the committee is that the laws do not prevent "members of bank councils, bank managers and ministers with responsibilities in the banking area from offering definite help to the Althing and to the public in general through statements regarding the condition of the state bank in question..." The resolution then goes on to say: "The Executive Committee lays emphasis on having bank council representatives of the People's Alliance fulfill the obligation to make such statements."

## Gestsson Defeated

The Executive Committee resolution was passed 11 votes to 2. Only party chairman Svavar Gestsson and MP Steingrímur J. Sigfússon voted against the proposal, although several persons abstained. This outcome was accounted a victory for Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson and his followers, which have been waging a great struggle against the so-called "party owners." The outcome is at the same time a defeat for Svavar Gestsson. And this is not the first time that Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson has defeated him in the party Executive Committee.

MP Gardar Sigurðsson is not on the party Executive Committee but he does have a seat on the Credit Bank Council for the People's Alliance and it is against him that the resolution is primarily directed. The resolution is a vote of complete lack of confidence in Sigurðsson while People's Alliance proponents have been extremely uncomfortable about the fact that in all the discussions regarding Hafskip Inc. and the Credit Bank it has been possible to point to the fact that a representative of the party sits on bank council and has exactly the same responsibilities as the other members of the council. Sigurðsson has been unwilling to breach the system of bank privacy, which has been heavily criticized by Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson in the Althing, and it is unlikely that he will mend his ways with the new interpretation of the laws on bank privacy by the party Executive Committee lying before him. "It is nonsense," said Sigurðsson in an interview with MORGUNBLADID when he was asked his views on the Executive Committee resolution. He said that the issue concerned the party Althing delegation and that the Executive Committee had nothing to do with it.

The People's Alliance Executive Committee made its resolution on the bank council issue late on Monday, but it was not until afternoon on Tuesday that it become known. This is very irregular and is indicative of the hue and cry that arose in the party when it became clear that the party chairman have been utterly defeated in a vote and that a resolution of no confidence had been passed against a party MP.

The People's Alliance Althing delegation is in a real dilemma on account of the Executive Committee resolution. Some MPs wish to curry favor with the Executive Committee and remove Gardar Sigurðsson from the Credit Bank Bank Council and Helgi Seljan from the Agricultural Bank Bank Council. Others do not think this necessary. The outcome of the dispute will probably not be known before tomorrow when a joint session of the Althing chooses bank councils for the state banks. It is, however, clear that whatever the decision it will have unpleasant consequences.

## The Party Althing Delegation is Still Split

The People's Alliance people are likewise split in their positions on the fact finding committees that the Althing has called upon the Icelandic Supreme Court to create to look into the relations of Hafskip and the Credit Bank. Agreement has been obtained between the opposition and coalition parties to expand the scope of the committees and to grant them increased powers. However, the People's Alliance proposal that seven members of the Althing also take part in the activities of the committees was rejected. As a consequence

of this there has been a division of opinion in the People's Alliance Althing delegation as to whether or not the proposal on the fact finding committees should be supported as altered by the Althing or whether party MPs should abstain from supporting it and make clear their dissatisfaction with it. When the vote was taken, the view that members should vote for the proposal prevailed. Ragnar Arnalds, chairman of the party Althing delegation, was largely responsible for bringing this about. Svavar Gestsson, Steingrímur J. Sigfússon and Skuli Alexandersson were opposed. When the proposal came to a vote in the Upper Chamber of the Althing, Skuli Alexandersson changed his mind and voted for the proposal, as did the other members of the People's Alliance in the Upper Chamber. When the proposal was presented to the Lower Chamber the night before yesterday, Svavar Gestsson, Steingrímur Sigfússon and Guðrún Helgadóttir abstained while Gardar Sigurdsson, Geir Gunnarsson and Guðmundur J. Guðmundsson went along with the majority.

#### Criticism of THJODVILJINN

In a THJODVILJINN lead article yesterday written by Ossur Skarphedinsson there is criticism of the position of the majority of the party Althing delegation on the organization of the fact finding committees. The demand is made there for a more open investigation (something that would be completely contrary to all the normal rules) and it is asserted that the majority of the membership of the Althing and of the government have something to hide. "What are they afraid of? What is it that the Independence Party is afraid to bring into the light of day?" asks Skarphedinsson. People do not need to look too closely to see where this dart is being directed. It is a majority of the People's Alliance Althing delegation that has cold feet about grappling with the Hafskip issue and has voted in such a way concerning fact finding that THJODVILJINN has characterized as "sweeping the dirt under the rug." People are now tensely awaiting the reactions of Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson, who has had little to say in days past. The struggles within the People's Alliance Party are clearly not at an end.

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POLITICAL

ICELAND

# MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS SET FOR 31 MAY, 14 JUNE

Stockholm NORDISK KONTAKT in Norwegian No 3, 1986 p 41

[Unattributed report: "Voting Age Expected to Be Lowered to 18"]

[Text] An agreement has been reached among the parties that the municipal elections in the spring should take place in two steps, 31 May in the larger towns and villages and 14 June in some places in the districts. This is in agreement with existing law, while a proposal for a new law regarding the municipalities which is before Parliament assumes that there should only be one election day, the second Sunday in June.

Opinions are very divided in the government parties whether the election should be so late in the larger towns and villages after very many have started their vacation in the middle of June. It is not certain that they will succeed in completing discussion of the proposal for a new municipal law in time before the election in the spring, and therefore an attempt is made to reach an agreement among the parties now.

Fridrik Sofusson, deputy chairman of the Independence Party, also stated that the voting age in the municipal elections will be lowered to 18, and that a special new law will be adopted in this regard, if it should prove to be necessary in case the new municipal law will not be passed before the election.

Fridrik Soffuson told that there is agreement among the parliamentary groups to lower the voting age to 18 right away this spring.

The parties have already started to prepare the municipal election. Recently test elections have taken place in various larger communities in the parties in connection with the nomination, and several such test elections are to take place very shortly. However, this is somewhat different according to parties and districts. In some places test elections are held, in other places opinion polls, and in several places the parties put up candidates without such preparations.

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POLITICAL

ICELAND

PAPER PROFILES FOREIGN MINISTER MATHIESEN

Stockholm NORDISK KONTAKT in Norwegian No 3, 1986 pp 67-68

[Text] Matthias A. Mathiesen, who started as Iceland's foreign minister on 24 January of this year, has been a member of Parliament for the Independence Party for over a quarter of a century. Over a number of years he has been one of the party's most important spokesmen in the areas of financial and trade policy. He was finance minister in Geir Hallgrimsson's government 1974-78 and minister of commerce in Steingrímur Hermannsson's government from May 1983 to October of last year.

Matthias is about 54 years old and was born in Hafnarfjörður on 6 August 1931. He took his university entrance examination in 1951 and completed his university law studies in 1957. He became an attorney in 1961 and was admitted to present cases to the Supreme Court in 1967. From 1967 to 1974 he had a law office in Hafnarfjörður. From 1958 to 1967 he was manager of the Hafnarfjörður savings and loan association.

Matthias was elected to Parliament in the spring of 1959, when he was barely 28 years old. Thus, he started his parliamentary career the same year as the long and fruitful governing, "reconstruction" period of the Independence and Social Democratic Parties. That lasted 12 years, until the spring of 1971, when the left parties received the majority in Parliament. That time was characterized by fast economic growth and freedom in commerce and industry. During the government term of the left parties 1971-74, Matthias was the opposition's most important spokesman during the budget negotiations in Parliament, and when the Independence Party was again in charge of government after large victories in the parliamentary elections in 1974 he became finance minister.

As finance minister, Matthias granted public employees the right to strike in 1977. The government was in severe conflict with the unions and the public employees, in particular in 1977 when wage agreements were made which were much higher than the compensation levels of industry, and in the election year 1978. The government was defeated in the election, and many believed that the finance minister in this government would have difficulties in his career in the immediate future. However, such predictions were wrong, and when the Independence Party became again part of the government in 1983 after having been in the opposition for five years, Matthias was appointed minister of

commerce. As minister of commerce Matthias initiated various changes in the price, bank and currency sectors which earned him praise from liberal quarters. He abolished various price restrictions, gave the banks and savings and loan associations increased freedom to make their own decisions regarding interest matters, abolished a special tourist tax on currency, gave people permission to use credit cards abroad and made it easier for people to take their property out of the country so that it is now possible to do this in the course of two years, while it took 15-20 years previously. Of these changes the increased interest freedom of the lending institutions had the greatest impact. It has led to a considerable increase in deposits in banks and savings and loan associations and has enormously increased the opportunities for owners of savings to earn a profitable return on their excess means. During the last months of his term as minister of commerce Matthias was involved in examining the Icelanders' market opportunities in Asia, where they had few trade connections so far. A few days before he stepped down as minister of commerce, he traveled with a group of business people and senior officials through the East and explored possibilities for a mutual exchange of goods. After he assumed the post as foreign minister he stated that he was interested in having these matters looked into more closely.

Matthias stated that he would continue the course in the Icelandic security policy which his predecessor Geir Hallgrímsson had drawn up. When Geir became Foreign Minister in 1983 he decided to advocate that the Icelanders themselves should be able to evaluate their security interests regardless of other nations in this area. He expanded the defense section of the Foreign Ministry and started preparations for the Icelanders to get their own experts in security and defense matters.

The new foreign minister is well known among Scandinavian politicians. He participated in most sessions of the Nordic Council since 1962 and was council president 1970-71. He also actively participated in the NATO organization of parliamentarians and was its chairman 1967-68.

Matthias is married to Sigrún Þorgílsdóttir.

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POLITICAL

NETHERLANDS

# SMALL RIGHTIST PARTIES VIEW COALITION WITH CDA, VVD

Amsterdam DE TIJD in Dutch 7 Mar 86 pp 14-17

[Article by Tom-Jan Meeus: "The High Price of the Small Rightist Parties"; first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] Now that a majority has once again become elusive for the CDA and the VVD, a burning question must again be raised: should the coalition continue with the support of the small Christian parties? The heads of the tickets of the smaller parties are demanding a "relatively high price," but they are willing. And CDA chairman Bukman is not ruling anything out.

Could they imagine themselves as cabinet ministers?

Meindert Leerling (RPF [Reformist Political Federation]), with uncertainty: "Well... no."

Gerrit Schutte (GPV [Reformed Political Alliance]), firmly: "Oh no, I am a member of parliament, and I hope to remain so for a long time."

Bas van der Vlies (SGP [Political Reformed Party]), cautiously: "My modesty requires me to say that I had better not make a statement on that right now."

One regularly gets a surrealistic impression when talking with the lead candidates of the three small Christian caucuses in the Second Chamber about something like governing. They are prepared "to enter into an open discussion in the cabinet formation talks," they do not "shun government responsibility," and they feel a need to present themselves as "a full-fledged government party." As if this had anything to do with reality.

And yet, if the portents are not deceiving, reality could indeed have a strange look after the May parliamentary elections. Two and one half weeks before the day of the city council elections, the CDA and the VVD are still under 75 seats in the opinion polls, and in view of the universally discerned bandwagon effect of the local elections, the situation after 21 May could indeed show the exact same picture. In that case, we will undoubtedly face an extremely fascinating cabinet formation process, whereby the Staphorst variant

[scenario in which CDA and VVD need support of small rightist parties to govern] is not being ruled out as a possible outcome--not even by CDA chairman Piet Bukman.

Indeed, whoever did not turn all of his attention last week to Bonkevaart, Bartlehiem and Evert van Benthem did in fact have prospects of Staphorst in mind. This because the coming of the cruise missiles to Woensdrecht has been definitively approved by Parliament, thanks to the SGP, the GPV and the RPF, without whose support the coalition would not have had a majority. Staphorst is now seen as being in the service of the cabinet, the missile and Woensdrecht.

And there was more last week. In the euthanasia issue, the greatest amount of attention was given to Ed Nijpel's floating party, but the cause of all this was nevertheless the fact that the CDA for the first time in quite a while took the same line as the small Christian caucuses with respect to an immaterial question.

The influence of the small Christian parties should not be overestimated, nor should it be underestimated. Thus--and in part because of the opinion polls, which are far from propitious for the coalition--we thought it was not a bad idea to ask the lead candidates of the three parties, which won six seats in the 1982 elections, how they plan to contribute to the coming of a second Lubbers cabinet. Do they like that idea? What is their price? How are they going to lead their campaigns (against the CDA)? And: what does Piet Bukman think of this?

The most fascinating of the talks with the three lead candidates is the one with Gerrit Schutte, the widely praised parliamentarian of the GPV.

[Question] Let us say that the elections turn out exactly as the polls are now indicating: just short of a CDA-VVD majority. And let us say that subsequently a cabinet formation operative comes to you to help make such a coalition a workable majority. Do you then say that you want to take part in that cabinet, or do you prefer the approach of silent support without active participation?

[Schutte] "Of course, the first point is: do the CDA and the VVD want it? But even if they answer this question in our direction, it seems to me to be improbable, out of numerical considerations alone, to think about participation in such a cabinet."

[Question] As far as you are concerned the debate is in fact only about the possibility of passive support for such a coalition?

[Answer] "Well now, passive... The question is: are you ready to lend support to such a cabinet in some fashion? We will certainly enter into the debate that must be conducted about that because we are a serious party."

[Question] And then the operative asks: Mr Schutte, what is the price for your support?

[Answer] "Then I say, here is our platform, in which we indicate exactly what our priorities are and what our focal points are, let's have a reaction. Which points are most important for me? It's not right at precisely this moment, 3 months before the election, to provide a ranking in the sense of: this is worth 10 points, that is worth 9, and this 6. People know our platform, they know which points are so important to us that there is no compromising on them. If other people want to reach a compromise with us on these issues--and most people do know what we are talking about--then that is impossible. The example of euthanasia is of course quite obvious at the moment; a solution in which we assume joint responsibility for any form of legalized euthanasia is thus impossible. But of course this does not mean that talks on a coalition would then come to a halt. You can assume that in such a situation all sorts of variations will turn up that cannot be calculated right now."

[Question] That sounds cryptical.

[Answer] "Look, right now the CDA and the VVD are also debating a matter of principle like euthanasia. In this as well, a conclusion must be reached at some point. Now, you can reach conclusions in terms of content, but you can also reach conclusions in terms of procedure. There is something of a difference there."

[Question] But let us say that you do not want to bear any responsibility for a compromise on euthanasia by the CDA-VVD coalition. Do you then drop your support of this type of minority cabinet across the board?

[Answer] "You cross that bridge when you come to it. It cannot be assessed right now."

Schutte is thus not sharpening his knives yet; he is waiting things out.

Meindert Leerling has indeed sharpened his knives, but they are not that sharp.

[Question] The cabinet formation operative comes to talk to you about participating in the government. What issues do you definitely bring up?

[Leerling] "I do not say: these demands must be accommodated if the support of the RPF is to be reckoned with. But something will have to be put forward. RPF participation will have to be honored in the policy that is to be pursued. And I am certainly not an advocate of a variation whereby the small Christian parties lend passive support. That is a bad thing. We either keep our hands free or we participate, but then in a real sense. A price must be paid, naturally in proportion to the number of seats that you provide, but if there is that much of a desire to have us there, then a disproportionately high price will probably have to be paid for it. That's politics, after all."

[Question] What does that disproportionately high price consist of?



[Answer] "It is probably good to say that our platform also makes clear statements about material issues. It's not a situation of 'if the RPF gets something in the area of pro-life legislation, then you can just play around with them in other areas.'"

[Question] Aside from the fact that the greatest differences will be in the immaterial realm.

[Answer] "Well, take the individualization concept. This has everything to do with income policy, social security, the tax system, you name it. This is a serious issue for us."

[Question] Emancipation policy?

[Answer] "Yes, things like that as well. Of course, that is partly an ethical question, but it also touches on socioeconomic policy. But I must say that it will always be a question of give and take."

[Question] Although of course there are limits. Abortion, for example.

[Answer] "Pro-life legislation is very important to us. This issue will continue to play a role in politics in the years ahead, and we will clearly raise our voices correspondingly. But I'm not going to say at this point what our limits are."

[Question] Can we assume that you could potentially come to support some form or another of active euthanasia? Do you have a clear opinion on this?

[Answer] "Of course. And we will never deviate from it. Legal regulation of the termination of life on demand is unacceptable to the RPF."

Leerling tones down the possibility of cabinet participation. "The large parties will indeed have to submit to us if they are going to have to come asking us for structural support. They are going to have to make sacrifices. But I think that the CDA and the VVD hope with all their hearts that they will not need us. And for me it remains to be seen whether the CDA, faced with a choice between the PVDA and the small Christian parties, will then choose us. So yes, as far as we are concerned, that option is open."

[Question] Is your party willing to take a seat in a cabinet with Kappeyne in her present post with her present policy?

[Answer] "I don't agree with that policy, but I am just as unwilling to erect obstacles to individuals beforehand. I won't do that."

[Question] And Minister De Koning, who recently defended the proposal on obligatory labor in Parliament against the wishes of his own party, the CDA?

[Answer] "I don't agree with that either, but that as well does not need to be an obstacle to possible participation by the RPF in a cabinet in which Minister De Koning has to defend a different policy than he is doing now."

[Question] You are actually quite lenient right now.

[Answer] "I don't think that I have to be too public about our list of demands at the moment. We have a platform, and if it comes to that it will be a question, as I said, of give and take."

The head of the SGP ticket, Bas van der Vlies, is having difficulty being concrete. He wants to cooperate, he says, but he is not willing to commit himself. He appears to always be thinking that the CDA could be frightened off--but that could be a misunderstanding.

After some urging, he goes this far, but no further: "You know that our political objectives contain quite a few points of principle that are so essential that it would be difficult for us to abandon them. Apart from that, we live in a reality, in a society, in which a majority feels that that is indeed possible. Well, for us that is the political reality. We exist inside it, we assume our responsibility inside it. And that also determines the extent to which our ideals can be realized."

[Question] But from what you are saying now, it appears as if you are open to persuasion about any issue. Is this not the case?

It is not the case. Van der Vlies: "We continue to insist that assisting in the voluntary termination of life cannot be legalized just like that. There is one power, God, our Creator, who gives life and takes life away. That is our starting point."

The unwillingness of all three parties to compromise on immaterial questions is thus solidly intact. This is consequently the price that the CDA and the VVD will potentially have to pay for the support of the small Christian parties. It thus appears that we are not any closer to Staphorst. But these gentlemen also recognize that they could become an inevitable partner. Or, as Van der Vlies puts it: "Naturally the CDA sees the opinion polls too. And they have recently been displaying an unambiguous image. I assume that one can see where that situation could lead."

And yet there is another question that is perhaps more interesting. As we stated earlier, it appears that the CDA is taking increasing notice of the small Christian parties, certainly since the rise of the RPF in 1981, which is often explained as being because of its somewhat libertarian position with respect to the morality legislation of then-Minister of Justice De Ruiter in the first Van Agt cabinet. Does the CDA position on euthanasia not demonstrate that the Christian Democrats are again turning increasingly to the small Christian parties?

Schutte: "It's not a set process, but the position in matters of principle of the small Christian parties has certainly had an influence on the CDA's determination of positions leaning in our direction in a number of matters. Compare the preliminary bill on equal treatment introduced by Mrs Kraayeveld-Wouters in 1980 with the cautious reaction within the CDA caucus now. And

compare the the change in position within the CDA caucus on obligatory labor. All areas in which it appears that parties such as the GPV, the SGP and the RPF have influenced the position of the CDA caucus."

[Question] Isn't that exactly what you want? Can you hope for more?

[Answer] "The fact that we have influence does not mean that we have enough influence. The bigger we become, the more influence we will gain."

All three parties are very aware of the fact that their influence will only increase if they hammer away at the euthanasia issue during the campaign--whereby they are the only ones who say that it is in fact an issue for the electoral campaign. Van der Vlies: "I cannot imagine that the possible legislation with respect to euthanasia, which is now occupying the hearts and minds of so many, can be kept out of the campaign. Issues of life and death are of essential significance to all people. Well, in that case we feel that the voters should have a clear image of where their party stands on that issue. We will certainly not polarize people on this issue or talk about it in nuances, but certainly with determination and based on principles."

And Leerling: "Of course euthanasia must become an election issue. I think that it should play a very central role. Not to raise a bunch of trivialities, but to let the voters know where the differences are. I would consider it unjustified if it were not a topic in the electoral campaign."

The small Christian parties would certainly not emerge in a bad position from this test in terms of campaign style.

Ultimately, the question remains: are the CDA and the VVD potentially willing to cooperate with the small Christian parties? CDA chairman Bukman put it this way: "Our first option is that there come about a cabinet based on a good, considerable parliamentary majority. Thus, we would prefer to not be dependent on the small rightist parties, the small leftist parties or anything else that is small."

[Question] But are you ruling out the possibility of cooperation with the small Christian parties?

[Answer] "No. I am not ruling out anything. You should never rule anything out. But it doesn't seem to me to be a very easy road--a minority cabinet of the CDA and the VVD that relies on the passive support of the small Christian parties."

[Question] Does this mean that in such a case you would prefer a CDA-PVDA cabinet?

[Answer] "My preference is that the present coalition preserve its majority. This is what I am counting on as well."

[Question] But the assumption was that this will not take place: do you then prefer a cabinet with the PVDA over a CDA-VVD minority coalition based on the support of the small Christian parties?

[Answer] "Look," Bukman says, "this is a little too far ahead for me. I like to play chess, but I don't think that I am the right person to go out and write a chess book, with all conceivable variations."

The CDA chairman apparently has nothing to say about whether he would rather rule with the PVDA or continue with a CDA-VVD cabinet, supported by the small Christian parties. This should give the PVDA in particular something to think about.

Because for the time Bukman appears to have a considerably better chance at becoming minister than do Leerling, Schutte and Van der Vlies.

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POLITICAL

NETHERLANDS

PERSONAL DIFFERENCES, FUTURE OF PEACE MOVEMENT

Van Putten Leaves IKV

Amsterdam DE VOLKSKRANT in Dutch 20 Mar 86 p 19

[Article by Hans Hansen: "Departure of Van Putten Compels IKV into Clear-Cut Agreements"; first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] In the approaching adjustment of the rules of the game for the leadership of the Interchurch Peace Council (IKV), it will be impossible for Mient-Jan Faber and his staff to escape restrictions on their elbow room. The authorities of the new chairman will at any rate be defined more clearly, according to the first conclusions since the outbreak of management conflict within the IKV.

"The differences of opinion between chairman Jan van Putten and secretary Mient-Jan Faber of the Interchurch Peace Council can be explained primarily by their personalities. You could say that they are too much like one another. It was Faber himself who proposed Van Putten for the chairmanship, but I soon saw the relationship between them sour. And yet I think that Jan van Putten split too quickly." This was the conclusion of Jan ter Laak of Pax Christi, who as a member of the executive committee of the IKV took especially great pains to find a workable formula for cooperation between Faber and Professor Dr Van Putten. But it eventually became evident that the lingering incompatibility between the two was irresolvable.

A statement by the IKV on the conflict confirmed that "Van Putten advocated views on specific points of policy and on the method of operation of the IKV that were certainly present in parts of the IKV campaign council, but that were not shared by the majority of the executive committee." Jan ter Laak explains what the differences were: "On the settlement of the cruise missile issue, it was in part a question of the relationship of the IKV to party politics. Van Putten was galled at Faber's public criticism in an NRC HANDELSBLAD interview of the PVDA and the Committee for No to the Cruise Missiles (KKN). The chairman felt passed over and hurt. What it came down to was that Faber had indeed conveyed the feelings of the executive committee in the interview, but the question was whether it was a good thing to take it outside the committee like that. Faber and Van Putten were both raised Reformed and both are PVDA members."



## Eastern Europe

Another point of discord revolved around policy towards the peace movement in the East Bloc. In the opinion of Gaber and others, contacts with official peace councils in Eastern Europe had panned out poorly. In this way, state councils had allowed meetings with independent committees to fall through. The question now was how these contacts with the East Bloc should continue in the most significant way. Faber feels that a reserved attitude should be taken with respect to the peace councils since too little loyal cooperation can be expected from them in working towards European detente. Van Putten does not agree with this. He believes that the official peace organizations in the East Bloc should not become isolated, and should thus remain involved in European deliberations. This was a matter of utmost concern for the chairman.

"A third point of friction for Van Putten was the assertion that the secretariat of the IKV puts too much time and energy into contacts abroad and too little into the domestic campaign, and that it is insufficiently concerned with the branch offices. On the executive committee, there was certainly agreement with a number of the chairman's views. At the meeting on Tuesday evening, Van Putten was rather angry about the arrival of two foreign guests. He said that he knew nothing about it. He explained to what extent this underscored the marginalization of his position. His not knowing about those guests was actually due to a misunderstanding," Ter Laak says.

"The fact that the structure and the method of operation of the executive committee of the IKV are not clearly spelled out in writing has to do with the historic development of the movement. The IKV began as an office. Later it became a complete movement with 500 branch offices, a campaign council, an executive committee and a chairman. With Ben ter Veer as chairman, cooperation worked very well for many years despite the lack of a clear breakdown of authority. With us, agreements in this context can be compared to those between caucus leader Den Uyl and party chairman Van den Bergh of the PVDA. Before a new IKV chairman is named, the authorities of the secretary, the chairman and the secretariat have to at least be formulated concretely. Perhaps the best thing would be to decide on an interim period in order to put things in order before we seek out a new and authoritative outside candidate for the post of chairman," the priest-secretary of Pax Christi says.

## Influence

Ter Laak refers to other differences of opinion concerning the way in which IKV should deal with the political parties. "Faber, and I agree with him, assumes that we can expect a greater effect from our work if the PVDA is in the government. This would mean direct political influence. Others see the IKV's duty more in terms of operating at a greater distance from politics in propagating our moral convictions. Faber believes that he can influence PVDA opinion through interviews. Thus, there are differing thoughts on this."

Ds Jan van Veen of the executive committee points out that the secretariat of the IKV cannot function exclusively as an administrative office. "A creative

method of operation is necessary. We on the executive committee have for some time been talking about an adjustment in relations between chairman, executive committee and secretariat. From the suggestions and reactions, Van Putten did not get the impression that things would be any better in the future. He did not want to wait around for the results of our deliberation. In our movement, we cannot live in a strict hierarchy with the chairman as the supreme head. Thus, a special feeling is necessary for us in adjusting the rules of the game, and Van Putten didn't have this. He was less familiar with the accumulated culture. Too often, he perceived the course of things as a repudiation of the chairman. We might ask ourselves now whether perhaps the members of the executive committee have become too short-sighted. It is certainly not the case that Mient-Jan Faber is being protected through thick and thin, but he has after all over the course of the years built up a position and a degree of prestige deserving of respect. Now that we are heading for a more solid structure, his post as secretary in relation to the executive committee and the secretariat is naturally up for discussion," Ds Van Veen explains.

#### Irritations

Ex-chairman Ben ter Veer, who was no longer able to combine IKV work with his job at the University of Groningen and passed the leadership over to Van Putten, is nevertheless still a member of the executive committee: "Mient-Jan Faber's position was not up for discussion at the last meeting. Nor was a word said about a new chairman. After all, Jan van Putten's resignation was unexpected. In recent months we met four times concerning his irritations. There seemed to be a new basis for trust and cooperation in sight. So he must have made his decision to resign at short notice. The arrival of the two foreigners, which he knew nothing about, could have been the straw that broke the camel's back," Ter Veer says.

Saturday, the campaign council of the IKV meets in Utrecht. This body consists of approximately 50 delegates, 25 from church organizations and 30 from regional offices. At this meeting there will also be a report on the circumstances surrounding the resignation of Prof Van Putten.

#### Role of KKN

Amsterdam DE VOLKSKRANT in Dutch 20 Mar 86 p 21

[Article by peace movement activist Ron Rote: "KKN Can Again Offer Perspective to the Peace Movement"; first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] The chairman of the IKV, Prof Dr Jan van Putten, has stepped down because of disagreements with IKV secretary Mient-Jan Faber. The immediate cause: an interview in which Faber said that the days of the Committee for No to the Cruise Missiles [KKN] were over and that the IKV would do better to pull out of the KKN. However, this incident is only the tip of the iceberg. Drs Ron Rote, who is active in the peace movement, describes what is going on here and what the future holds. He believes that the KKN should remain in existence.

It appears that the KKN is going under because of internal tensions after the parliamentary decision on the stationing of cruise missiles. However, these tensions have been in existence for some time. As long as the KKN was able to organize demonstrations, campaign weeks and a popular petition, it maintained its uniquely broad degree of outside support.

Internally, many KKN members--peace movement groups, parties and labor unions--have had to swallow a good many things. That period is now over for good. I am not revealing any inside secrets when I write about the following tensions and changes.

#### Realo's and Fundo's

The breadth of the KKN was its strength, and it now appears to be its weakness. A respectable base of support has been achieved. Ten thousand people have for years carried out campaigns and contemplated a different peace policy. This base of support has now grown up. Some KKN members cannot or will not accept this.

The realists ["realo's"] still think that talking with Parliament and with the government will lead to something. On the other hand, the fundamentalists ["fundo's"] point to the importance of the cruise missiles in an American offensive strategy oriented towards the encirclement and eventually even the destruction of the USSR. This line of policy is represented by the smaller parties and peace movement groups within the KKN, but increasingly by activists in the approximately 700 peace platforms as well. These supporters are thinking things over and now want to have joint say in the future course of the entire peace movement as well.

#### PVDA and CDA

Another point of disagreement lies between (especially) the IKV and Pax Christi on the one hand and the Labor Party on the other. The Christian "realo" peace movement wants to continue talking with the CDA after 21 May; that is part of their *raison d'être*. Thus, they want to distance themselves somewhat from the PVDA. Faber is going too far in accusing the PVDA of intractability.

There is also divisiveness on the question of which more far-reaching campaigns should be supported. In IKV circles, talking about civil disobedience with respect to the cruise missiles has become nearly taboo. The overriding fear there is of becoming sandwiched between cautious churches who continue to reject this form of civil disobedience and a radicalized group of IKV supporters who do in fact want to go much further.

The small leftist parties support more far-reaching resistance, such as the Don't Participate campaign at Woensdrecht. They are willing to consider forms of non-violent resistance, together with the peace platforms which will now be operating more independently. In their view, the KKN should offer support to these campaigns and platforms in the form of study meetings on civil disobedience and on new international military and political developments. There is moreover a desire for support in the form of publicity and money.

Looking at this sphere of influence, one must conclude that there are prospects for the KKN, at least in its present framework and composition.

### Cooperation

The peace movement is currently facing a new phase: that of complementary strategies. The basic assumptions in this are cooperation where necessary and disagreement where possible. Realo's and fundo's can go off and reflect on their own basic assumptions and sources, their organizational structure, their basis of support and their target group.

People will continually be confronted with peace issues, in their church, their union, their political party or their women's group, in their work and as consumers, everywhere. The seed of a different way of thinking and acting on peace issues will now have to permeate all spheres of life. The KKN would not be able to do this, but all the organizations can indeed do this individually. There is going to be room for new creativity and energy.

Thus, this means complementary, mutually supportive campaigns, in which it must be kept in mind that the leadership and the grass roots, realo's and fundo's, members of parliament and activists need one another. The leadership needs grassroots campaigns in order to make it clear that the decision on stationing has deeply divided the Netherlands. Thousands of people are convinced of the necessity of resistance to what they see as a fundamental threat to the survival of us all. Consequently, resistance campaigns must be interpreted in The Hague in these terms by the realo's.

### Social Capital

Moreover, the campaigns legitimize the talks between the cautious peace movement groups and the government and Parliament: politicians will certainly not be able to ignore these talks. Also, the rank and file often provides a sharp analysis of U.S. power politics. Another important function of grassroots campaigns is to fuel debate on civil disobedience and the criteria and values at stake in it.

In general, the more "realistic" movement groups will have to come to the realization that people on the grassroots level and those involved in campaigns have just as much expertise on peace issues as the war and peace specialists in the leadership of the IKV and Pax Christi. Indeed, the people know much more: over the past few years, they have gained experience in conducting campaigns and in cooperating, and they are ready to go further. In the broadest sense, this is social capital for the peace movement that must be utilized.

But conversely the leaders of the grassroots campaigns also need the support of the more moderate peace movement. The latter can prevent groups that continue to oppose stationing from being criminalized. They must provide the link between grassroots groups and churches, the Parliament or labor unions. Continuing resistance must not be marginalized or isolated, because that would be too good an outcome for the militarists.



The grassroots movement also needs thematic reinforcement, a further thinking-out of political and strategic questions. In this way, local campaigns are connected to a broad, international peace movement, a network of resistance in East and West. They become a symbol of resistance to bloc thinking, militarism and defeatism. The quality of their campaigns must demonstrate convincingly what they have in mind: better relations between people and countries, a dignified, free way of life in which animosity no longer has a place. A policy in which shared security is a premise. Persistently and peacefully, grassroots resistance can expand into an unstoppable movement that inspires all of society towards good.

#### No Other Way

Is this a dream, a foolish illusion? Perhaps. But there is no other way for the peace movement in the Netherlands than this one. It is true that one precondition is that the KKV remains in existence, as an expression of broad resistance to further arms buildup and blind militarism.

Together with the more radical peace organizations, joined together in the Broad Initiative for More Far-Reaching Campaigns Against Cruise Missiles (BIVAK), the KKV will arrive at a division of responsibilities. It will have to follow the new cabinet like a watchdog. It will have to support debates on civil disobedience as well as its own campaigns by the peace platforms. In this multi-faceted strategy, the KKN thus still has an important role to play. This crisis within the peace movement bears the seed of a new perspective.

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POLITICAL

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#### ANALYSIS OF RECENT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 22 Feb 86 pp 15, 16

[Article by Mario Bacalhau]

[Text] The recent presidential elections caused an unexpected wave of emotional reactions in the country which brought back memories of the so-called "hot summer" of 1975. The old reactionary slogans such as "If he is not for us he is against us," "We are good, and the others are bad," "Those who are for us are democrats, those who are not are reactionaries," "All Communists to Siberia," and many others of a similar style again invaded streets and homes through all the media. The atmosphere became so aggressive that we are still wondering today how it was possible to control retaliatory acts which seemed to be erupting at every instant. Here and in small groups, in the streets and in factories, action took the form of insults and physical attacks of minor import.

These elections also showed the guilt complex which people who were adults prior to 1974 have as a result of having lived during an historic period in which only several thousand Portuguese, if we do not count the members of the Communist Party, fought against or suffered under the Salazar regime, and then not always for political reasons.

#### Sociological Framework

Aside from the marks it has left on Portuguese society, and particularly on youth, the consequences of which can be measured in the short or medium term, some of the aspects of this election campaign period, such as the participation of the intellectuals and information agencies and the candidates' television time, should be examined in depth. The general analysis of the election results which I intend to set forth here is probably the least interesting aspect, the consequences of which have already been overtaken by events. The sociological framework, including geographical, demographic, economic and political aspects, could reveal the importance of certain cultural aspects which helped various candidates gain acceptance and influenced voters.

The division of the votes of the PS and the parties politically to its left between candidates Mario Soares, Maria de Lurdes Pintasilgo and Salgado Zenha was the most interesting aspect for political observers. There were charismatic candidates such as Mario de Lurdes Pintasilgo and party candidates such

as Mario Soares supported by the PS, and Salgado Zenha by the PCP and the PRD facing the same electorate. Of course Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo was defeated, and Mario Soares beat out Salgado Zenha by winning over a significant percentage of the socialist electorate which had voted for the PRD in the 6 October 1985 legislative elections. Mario Soares not only had the most stable and well-organized party support, but, because his profile is that of the average Portuguese, he went on to the second round with Freitas do Amaral, the candidate supported by the PSD, CDS and other parties situated politically to the right.

#### Voting Trends since 1976

A biased interpretation of the polls, which did not take into account the fact that people's attitudes and opinions are based on concrete situations and are as changeable as the times, and an underestimation of Mario Soares' image, more or less that of an average, middle-class Portuguese, led people to regard him as a losing candidate.

The support of the PS, the PRD and the PC, which launched a violent attack on Mario Soares in the first round, saying that Ramalho Eanes' support would be enough to guarantee Zenha's victory, was inevitable in the second round.

With all this support, it was not very likely that Freitas do Amaral would defeat Mario Soares, unless those in charge of his campaign, besides having the decisive support of Prime Minister Cavaco Silva, had more time to correct certain organizational problems which had not been so evident during the first round.

Mario Soares had the support of an electorate which had systematically voted with the PS, the PCP and other parties to their left in the previous presidential elections and in the legislative elections. Voting trends were as follows (bearing in mind that the number of registered voters increased from 6,683,328 in 1976 to an estimated 7,621,504 by 5 October 1985):

| <u>YEARS</u> | <u>Votes for PSD, CDS and others to their right</u> | <u>Votes for PS, PCP and others to their left</u> |
|--------------|---|---|
| 1976         | 2,266,690   | 2,959,234   |
| 1979         | 2,789,701   | 3,045,619   |
| 1980         | 2,900,424   | 2,988,309   |
| 1983         | 2,346,141   | 3,217,237   |
| 1985         | 2,310,323   | 3,283,339   |

The increase in votes by about 1,100,000 went to swell the abstentions, which rose from 1,097,735 in 1976 to 1,877,183 on 6 October 1985, and may or may not be of political significance, as was mentioned elsewhere.

#### Freitas Made Gains in APU Areas

Thus Mario Soares' victory reflected a polarization of the electorate of all the parties supporting him, in spite of the fact that he did not manage to

gather all the votes in the recent legislative elections and even the votes of the people voting in the first round. In comparison with the legislative elections of 6 October, he lost an estimated 267,989 votes and was not able to collect the 31,300 votes obtained in the first round. Even without taking into account the growth of the electorate, these were the worst results since 1976, if we exclude 1980.

Freitas do Amaral only received 2,310,323 votes from the parties supporting him, even disregarding the support of part of the PSD, which probably caused his defeat. Positioned politically to the right, Freitas do Amaral had in his favor an image of honesty and competence and, above all, Cavaco Silva's support. In the first round on 27 January, he obtained 2,628,355 votes, 215,075 more than the parties supporting him, and 2,864,728 in the second round, possibly picking up votes as a result of a decline in abstentions by about 3 percent. Freitas do Amaral practically equalled Sa Carneiro's victory in the 1980 legislative elections.

In terms of the voters supporting each of the candidates in each district, Freitas do Amaral exceeded the votes of the corresponding parties. In the Setubal districts, in which the ratio of voters for Freitas do Amaral and voters for the PSD, CDS and PDC is 1.45, and in Beja 1.39 and Evora 1.30, predominant APU zones, this candidate received over a third more votes than the parties supporting him.

#### Soares Did Better in the Islands

Mario Soares barely exceeded the number of votes of the parties supporting him in the Azores and Madeira, and came closer but did not attain this in the districts of Aveiro (0.96), Braga (0.97), and Porto (0.95).

In the first and second rounds, Freitas do Amaral basically kept the same breakdown of voters by various political zones, classified on the basis of the parties which received 50 percent or more of the votes in the 6 October 1985 elections for the National Assembly.

In Zone A, in which the PSD and CDS have more than 50 percent of the electorate, Freitas do Amaral received a proportionately higher percentage of total votes (30.3 percent in the 2nd round) than the percentage of the national electorate residing in this geographical area (23.9 percent).

In Zone B, considered a transition zone between the PSD and the PS, and contiguous to the previous zone and easily penetrated, Freitas do Amaral received a smaller percentage of votes in the second round (27.5 percent) than the percentage of votes existing in that zone (27.6 percent). We believe that it was in this zone that the candidate lost his opportunity to be elected, as a result of failing to win over the voters who were close by.

In Zone C, a transition area between the PSD and the PRD, formerly the PS, Freitas do Amaral and Mario Soares received more or less the same percentage of the votes.

In Zone D, a transition area between the PSD, PRD and PS, which has 27 percent of the electorate, is the second largest in terms of the number of voters, and includes the Lisbon district, Mario Soares obtained 38.1 percent of his votes and Freitas do Amaral 23.7 percent.

In Zones E and F, in which the APU, PS and/or PRD received 50 percent or more in the recent legislative elections, Mario Soares obtained 15 percent of his votes in the second round, which shows the importance of the communist electorate in his election. In the first round, Mario Soares received only 7.4 percent of his total votes from voters in this area.

#### Freitas Better in Rural Areas

Freitas do Amaral's electorate is primarily linked to rural activities, and especially small farms, according to the population characteristics of the municipalities and districts in which he received the largest number of votes. The description of the PSD and CDS electorates appearing the electoral geography study entitled "Elections to the National Assembly from 1979-1983" can be applied to Freitas do Amaral's electorate: a heavy concentration in areas of the country where small farmers predominate and religion is practiced regularly.

In contrast, Mario Soares' electorate is not as homogeneous as Freitas do Amaral's, because of the different characteristics of the PS and the APU/PCP electorates. The APU/PCP electorate is generally found in areas where the PSD and CDS receive fewer votes, the practice of religion is infrequent, small farmers are not predominant, and the agricultural proletariat (large land holdings) and the industrial proletariat (suburban areas) have a significant weight in the working population.

The PS/PRD electorate is found in areas where the PSD and the CDS have significant percentages of the electorate, people tend to practice their religion regularly, small farmers form a majority of the working population and there are urban centers of more than 10,000 inhabitants with a new middle class involved in dynamic businesses and industries.

According to polls taken during the electoral campaign, Mario Soares appears to have more voters in the 39-45 age bracket than Freitas do Amaral, who has a greater concentration of voters in the 18-29 and 50-and-over age brackets.

More voters with a primary school education, one of the main characteristics of the rural population, are found in Freitas do Amaral's camp than in Mario Soares'. The new president garners his main support from urban centers, where greater percentages of the population have higher levels of education.

1) Distribuição, em percentagem, dos eleitores inscritos, dos votantes, da abstenção e dos votantes em F. Amaral e M. Soares, por zonas agrupadas segundo a principal tendência política (50% ou mais de votos).

| (2) Zonas políticas | (3) Distritos   | (4) Inscritos |           | (5) Votantes |           | (6) Abstencão |           | (7) F. Amaral |           | (8) M. Soares |           |
|---------------------|---|---------------|-----------|--------------|-----------|---------------|-----------|---------------|-----------|---------------|-----------|
|                     |   | 1.ª volta     | 2.ª volta | 1.ª volta    | 2.ª volta | 1.ª volta     | 2.ª volta | 1.ª volta     | 2.ª volta | 1.ª volta     | 2.ª volta |
| A — PSD e CDS       | Aveiro, Bragança, Guarda, Leiria, V. do Castelo, V. Real, Viseu | 23.9          | 23.3      | 27.1         | 25.8      | 30.1          | 30.3      | 23.1          | 16.8      |               |           |
| B — PSD e PS        | Braga, Coimbra, Porto   | 26.6          | 27.6      | 24.0         | 22.8      | 27.9          | 27.5      | 32.9          | 27.8      |               |           |
| C — PSD e PRD       | Castelo Branco, Santarém  | 7.3           | 7.3       | 7.4          | 7.6       | 7.2           | 7.2       | 6.5           | 7.3       |               |           |
| D — PSD, PS, PRD    | Faro, Lisboa, Portalegre  | 26.8          | 27.0      | 25.0         | 26.2      | 23.5          | 23.7      | 25.6          | 38.1      |               |           |
| E — APU, PS         | Beja e Évora  | 3.9           | 3.8       | 4.1          | 4.3       | 2.1           | 2.1       | 2.4           | 5.4       |               |           |
| F — APU, PRD        | Setúbal   | 6.9           | 7.0       | 6.1          | 6.9       | 4.0           | 4.2       | 5.0           | 9.6       |               |           |
| G — PSD, CDS        | Açores, Madeira   | 4.6           | 4.0       | 6.4          | 6.5       | 5.2           | 5.1       | 4.4           | 3.1       |               |           |
| TOTAL               | —   | 100           | 100       | 100          | 100       | 100           | 100       | 100           | 100       | 100           | 100       |

Key:

1. Percentage breakdown of registered voters, votes, abstentions for F. Amaral and M. Soares, by zones formed on the basis of their main political leaning (50 percent or more of the votes).
2. Political Zones
3. Districts
4. Registered Voters: 2nd round
5. Voters: 2nd round
6. Abstentions: 1st round; 2nd round
7. F. Amaral: 1st round; 2nd round
8. M. Soares: 1st round; 2nd round



(9) *Coefficiente da relação entre o número de votantes nos candidatos e o número de votantes nos partidos que os apoiaram nas eleições de Outubro.*

| (10) DISTRITOS | (11) Eleitores<br>F. Amaral     | (12) Eleitores<br>M. Soares             |
|----------------|---------------------------------|---|
|                | (13) Eleitores<br>PSD, CDS, PDC | (14) Eleitores, PS, PRD<br>PCP e outros |
| Aveiro         | 1.81                            | 0.96                                    |
| Beja           | 1.39                            | 0.90                                    |
| Braga          | 1.16                            | 0.97                                    |
| Bragança       | 1.26                            | 0.91                                    |
| C. Branco      | 1.33                            | 0.85                                    |
| Coimbra        | 1.29                            | 0.95                                    |
| Evora          | 1.30                            | 0.90                                    |
| Faro           | 1.24                            | 0.93                                    |
| Guarda         | 1.21                            | 0.89                                    |
| Leiria         | 1.26                            | 0.86                                    |
| Lisboa         | 1.28                            | 0.90                                    |
| Portalegre     | 1.29                            | 0.90                                    |
| Porto          | 1.22                            | 0.95                                    |
| Santarém       | 1.29                            | 0.89                                    |
| Setúbal        | 1.45                            | 0.87                                    |
| V. Castelo     | 1.25                            | 0.92                                    |
| V. Real        | 1.26                            | 0.93                                    |
| Viseu          | 1.23                            | 0.90                                    |
| Açores         | 1.13                            | 1.01                                    |
| Madeira        | 1.01                            | 1.21                                    |
| Total do País  | 1.24                            | 0.92                                    |

**Key:**

9. Ratio between the number of votes for the parties supporting them in the October elections.

10. Districts

11. Votes for F. Amaral

12. Votes for M. Soares


13. PSD, CDS, PDC votes

14. PS, PRD, PCP and other votes

## Comparação entre Outubro/85 e Fevereiro/86

(15)

TOTAL



(16)

O quadro mostra como Freitas do Amaral superou o resultado de PSD e CDS, em Outubro, e Soares ficou aquém do score dos partidos da esquerda

Key:

15. Comparison between October 1985 and February 1986

16. The graph shows how Freitas do Amaral exceeded the results for the PSD and CDS in October, and Soares came out below the score of the leftist parties.

9805/12859

CS0: 3542/67

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

COMMENTARY ASSESSES PRD'S ORIENTATION, FUTURE

Lisbon 0 DIABO in Portuguese 4 Mar 86 p 2

[Commentary by Jose Miguel Judice]

[Excerpt] I believe the PRD will survive. It will do so because it will search out the deadlocks and because a lack of political direction will continue to exist. However, I am also convinced that it cannot ever aspire to rival the PSD's or even the PS's political muscle. It will be a small to medium-size party anxious that a clear majority not emerge in Portugal because that is the key to the PRD getting a slice of power.

In the first place, the PRD supports the Cavaco Silva government just enough to keep the prime minister from becoming exasperated and leaving and it does so for purely practical reasons. The PRD is torn by internal contradictions (ideological, strategic and tactical) and it cannot clear these up under the penalty of falling apart. Its only salvation lies in Gen Ramalho Eanes military-like unification. Its only basis for unity, as it awaits the arrival of its beloved one, is to gain time, delay and avoid elections.

In the second place, the PRD does not want any kind of stability. It is precisely political instability that forms its power base, in the same way that presidential power lies in the government's instability. In the Portuguese political system, any president who has a parliamentary majority opposing him will be reduced to the role of cutting ribbons. This is true even in France. This is the reason that Mitterrand changed the electoral law to prevent the creation of a clear majority in the assembly. The PRD is the political/partisan expression of Eanes' method of conducting politics. It exists because of and for instability. It knows that it cannot have a clear direction and as a result it can never aspire to form a majority. As a result, it tries to prevent the formation of any other majority.

In the third place, and as a consequence of what was said earlier, the PRD will try to support and oppose the Cavaco Silva government as time goes on. It will thus oppose the government more as the latter's public image weakens. In this sense, the PRD is an epiphenomenon of the changes in public opinion. It has no political direction. All it has is the ability to understand what direction the winds of the times are blowing from. It is technocracy and opportunism at its best.

In the fourth place, the PRD will be subject to three different influences (all contradictory). These will increase its paralysis and intensify its political opportunism and sophistry. One of the PRD's tendencies is to form a Leftist, populist opposition inclined to accompany the PCP in social and local government struggles. A second tendency is said to want more or less stable alliances with the PS. Its goal is to form a moderate socialist or archaic social democratic bloc of the Left. A third tendency is more inclined toward a populism of the Right with its nostalgia for authority (sociological Eanism). It wants an alliance with the PSD, especially with Cavaco Silva, almost as if it sought a successor to Ramalho Eanes. These three tendencies are irreconcilable except on a case-by-case basis, depending on the circumstances and to defend eclectic solutions which cause paralysis in and of themselves.

In the fifth place, Ramalho Eanes' membership will resolve nothing. It will, if anything, heighten the contradictions because the former president is himself a living contradiction. In fact, his interpersonal relationships with people from his second term in office draw him to populism of the Left. His ideological-strategic position draws him to an alliance with the PS while his temperament and roots draw him to an alliance with the PSD. He will continue as he has until now. He will hint to some, acknowledge others, make promises to yet others and stall everyone.

The significance of all this is that "Eanism" is dead and no great evil will come to the world as a result. What has not died is the tragic character of the political instability, the lack of a clear majority, the ambiguity of ideological-political stands, the postponement of reforms and the constant negotiation under the pressure of various lobbies which sprout during times of excessive parliamentary power.

The PRD danger does not lie in its existence because even the PCP does not give it what it desires. There is no PRD danger if and when it becomes part of a bloc, chooses a strategy and clarifies what it is that it wants for Portuguese society. The PRD danger lies in the fact that the lack of a majority gives it power to blackmail and paralyze. The power structure must understand that this is the way it is and turn the spell on the sorcerer.

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POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

COMMENTS ON POPULAR APPROVAL OF CAVACO SILVA

Approval Questioned

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 7 Mar 86 p 6

[Article by Augusto Abelaira]

[Text] Is Cavaco Silva governing well or poorly? The parties do not give us an objective answer, they say what is to be expected: the PSD is governing well; the PS or PC governs poorly. As for the PRD, it is hard to tell how much credence to give to its views because we do not know exactly what we should expect of it. But Herminio Martinho says it is doing a good job overall and adds, giving with one hand what he takes away with the other, that the government cannot help but do a good job because of the favorable international economic outlook. Objectivity or secret maneuvering? Because, all things being equal, one can govern poorly under favorable conditions.

If we cannot trust what the parties say, what is "public opinion"? If the polls are to be believed, the majority answer that Cavaco Silva is doing a good job.

Not knowing what has led the majority to express that opinion, one might wonder why he is doing a good job. Why has unemployment declined and how has the problem of back wages, which was so troublesome for Freitas do Amaral, been resolved? Why is there now no problem of hunger, which was so talked about last year? Why has our daily life apparently become so much easier? Or why is the government publishing laws and assuring us that it is governing well? Or even why are the mass media telling us this is so, forgetting these problems?

I am not an economist, sociologist, historian or politician, but it seems to me that there is no way of telling (and it would be impossible to tell, at the end of 4 months) whether Cavaco Silva is governing well or poorly--we will have to wait (or at least we as average citizens will have to). We will have to wait until the results begin to be felt in our everyday lives, and in those areas not substantially influenced by the decline of the dollar and raw materials, and even by the financial recovery for which the previous government was responsible.



Thus when the majority says that Cavaco Silva is doing a good job, it just believes that to be true, regardless of the actual situation which is still as difficult today as it was before. Public opinion, therefore, contrary to appearances, is not reflecting current reality, but just (perhaps without realizing it) the hope that current reality will show that the government is performing well. This is a conclusion based on the unknown future, a hope--which may be borne out by facts--or may not be, as has happened in the past.

Whatever may be, by temporarily confusing hopes with reality, public opinion is favoring Cavaco Silva, something which nobody can deny him. This leads us to the question: how can this undeniable, notable phenomenon be explained? By the confident way he speaks, his fanatical self-assurance, which makes the most distrustful believe in him?

Consider this curious, significant excerpt taken from an interview with the prime minister: "It is evident that the PC and the PS are somewhat disturbed by the fact that the government is solving the problems of the people and the country." What proof is there that they are disturbed? He said so, with all confidence. But he went further: He said "it is solving" and not that "it will solve." In summary, why did the fact that it has solved problems (something which has not been proven) disturb the PC and the PS (something else that has not been proven)? Whatever he says goes. Or it has been accepted, or is being accepted. An impressive victory, if not over the irrefutable, stubborn facts, at least over people's consciences.

There remains one problem: unless I am mistaken, the majority who believe in Cavaco Silva preferred to elect Mario Soares. Why did a substantial percentage of the people who trust the prime minister, and who are seeing today what they could only see (or not see) in the future, paradoxically turn their backs on him during the presidential elections? Do they believe in him and at the same time fear him? Do they believe in him, but only on condition that they have Mario Soares as a safety valve?

P.S. A year ago there was a great deal of talk about hunger--by myself, inclusive. Today we hear nothing. Did it disappear, or is it just no longer a subject of conversation--and does what is no longer discussed then automatically cease to exist? Has it ceased to exist for everyone except the Bishop of Setubal? And those who are starving, naturally.

#### Approval Poll Results

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 22 Feb 86 p 15

[Text] A recent survey conducted by Norma for SEMANARIO clearly confirms the prestige of the current PSD administration headed by Cavaco Silva. Thus the results of the 16th and the election of Socialist Mario Soares to Belem apparently do not reflect a desire on the part of the electorate to penalize the government for its actions. On the contrary, as the table we have published shows, it enjoys significant support. Over 42 percent of those surveyed approve or fully approve of the government's performance, while only about 15 percent expressed disapproval of the activities of the current executive.

To get a better idea of what these figures reveal, let's compare them with those furnished by a survey conducted by the magazine CIENCIA POLITICA/Norma measuring the support for the PS/PSD administration of that time headed by Mr Soares. In February 1984, after it was 7 months into its term, only 9 percent of those surveyed rates its performance as good or very good, while 34 percent considered it to be negative (or very negative).

|   | (1) REGIÃO |         |        | HABITAT         |      |      |
|---|------------|---------|--------|-----------------|------|------|
|   | GR.        | GR. (2) | LITO3) | I. NORTE 52 MIL |      |      |
| TOTAL   | LISBOA     | PORTO   | RAL4)  | I. SUL          |      |      |
| TOTAL   | 7272       | 1676    | 756    | 2662            | 2178 | 4065 |
| 6) Apreciação da actuação actual do Governo PSD |            |         |        |                 |      |      |
| 7) Totalmente acordo                            | 10.6       | 13.3    | 17.2   | 5.2             | 12.7 | 10.6 |
| 8) De acordo                                    | 31.9       | 25.8    | 39.0   | 34.8            | 30.6 | 30.9 |
| 9) N/acord/N desaco.                            | 24.2       | 23.5    | 13.9   | 21.6            | 31.4 | 26.8 |
| 10) Em desacordo                                | 11.1       | 18.1    | 20.2   | 8.3             | 6.1  | 7.4  |
| 11) Totalm. desacordo                           | 3.7        | 1.6     | 1.8    | 6.2             | 3.0  | 4.4  |
| 12) Sem opinião                                 | 15.2       | 13.8    | 5.1    | 19.9            | 15.9 | 18.3 |
| 13) N/respondem                                 | 3.3        | 3.8     | 2.8    | 4.0             | 2.3  | 1.6  |

Key to table:

- |   |                                   |
|---|-----------------------------------|
| 1. Region   | 7. Fully approve                  |
| 2. Coast  | 8. Approve                        |
| 3. North  | 9. Neither approve nor disapprove |
| 4. South  | 10. Disapprove                    |
| 5. Thousand   | 11. Fully disapprove              |
| 6. Opinion of performance of current PSD government | 12. No opinion                    |
|   | 13. No response                   |

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MILITARY

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

U.S.-EUROPEAN TENSIONS AT WEHRKUNDE CONFERENCE ANALYZED

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 4 Mar 86 p 12

[Article by Ernst-Otto Maetzke: "American Knowledge and European Will: How NATO Could Strengthen Its Conventional Defensive Force"]

[Text] Munich, 3 Mar--There was no need for concern that this year's Wehrkunde [military science] conference in Munich with the general theme of "The Influence of New Technology on the Alliance" would revolve around the Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI] of the American president and its technical feasibility. The 150 politicians, military people, arms and disarmament specialists and publicists--most of them have known each other for years--hardly talked about it. About the only thing worthy of note was a difference of opinion between two American senators. One of them, Cohen, believed that "some restraints" were possible in the SEI research in exchange for verifiable reductions of Soviet weapon systems, whereas his colleague Wilson bluntly declared that SDI will not be "negotiated away." The majority of the conference participants seemed to believe Wilson.

Anyhow, most were primarily interested in the consequences of the complete withdrawal of the American and Soviet intermediate-range missiles from Europe as envisioned by Reagan. The fact that the presence of conventional Soviet power in Europe would attain a substantially greater importance under such a "zero option" was cause for much concern. In this consideration, it was useful that the all-too overworked catchword "uncoupling" of European security interests from American interests was swept from the table. Accordingly, neither technical progress nor the availability of highly developed weapon systems influences the ties and the affinity between the leading power in the Western alliance and its European partners. It is exclusively a political and psychological question rather than a technological one.

The European member countries of NATO, especially the FRG, have been put in a state of confusion by Reagan's proposed "zero option" because of their own previous public arguments. It was precisely this solution that they had presented as a great hope in the domestic-policy argument about counterarming, regrettably declaring it to be illusory, however. But now the zero-option must be swallowed--even though its dangers are obvious--not only because Reagan wants it but because it was just a few years ago that they themselves had enthusiastically pleaded for it. At the Wehrkunde conference, this unpleasant situation was the cause of unprecedented self-accusations of hypocrisy, untruthfulness and manipulation of the so-called "media" in

connection with arms-control policy. Every government and every opposition party wants to put itself on top with the spread of disarmament illusions that are effective in the public. When it involves the depiction of disarmament chimeras, all of those involved make a steady stream of perjurious false statements about the realistic threat analyses. We are now suffering the consequences.

There seems to be reason for optimism in regard to the rapid introduction of technically advanced conventional weapons into the European NATO armed forces. There are obviously a lot of very promising weapons developments available but there is a catch, as pointed out by an American military publicist: they will be kept "locked up in American garages." In this way, they have neither a deterrent effect nor can they contribute to increasing the staying power of the conventional armed forces of the alliance. General Altenburg, chief of staff of the Bundeswehr, immediately took up the theme: "The opening of the garages would be very welcome." But it seems that American hesitation about passing on technology is still preventing it. When U.S. Secretary of the Navy Lehman issued a similar special instruction for the naval forces, under which they could be upgraded with new technical developments already available, Federal Minister of Defense Woerner had sharp words: "We would gladly integrate the naval defensive systems but the prerequisite is the full transfer of technology. As defense minister, I must insist on it." The mood in the alliance seems to be worsening in this area.

The Americans would much rather recommend to their European allies that they strengthen their defensive will than pass on technical knowledge. If there were even more doubts on the other side of the Atlantic about this resolve than heretofore, then there would indeed be a danger of an uncoupling. The American mistrust was seen most clearly in the specific discussion of the defensive concept of doing something drastic against the follow-up strike forces of the Warsaw Pact immediately after an attack--even before they cross the border into NATO territory. Whether then, if at all, only conventional point-target weapons were used against such massings or whether Western troops might also be allowed to cross the previous dividing line with the East for the purpose of threatening the flank and whether the supposed tendency of the population of the socialist states to resist Soviet hostilities should be strengthened through practicable means was all controversial.

Even more disputable is whether one should take to heart American criticism of the willingness of European NATO governments to provide continual economic and technical help to the socialist states and especially the Soviet Union so as to use good will to bring about European stability. With noticeable disgust, U.S. Undersecretary Ikle read aloud such a statement and enclosed it in quotation marks: "We should help the East to modernize its economy; our help in the economic development of the Soviet Bloc will contribute to European stability." Ikle did not say where the quote came from. It is actually found in an interview given by Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs Genscher and it was circulated by the Foreign Ministry in a press statement in mid-December. But the American criticism of this interpretation met not only with German opposition. Trade and cultural exchanges with the socialist countries,

tourism and travel as well as radio broadcasting across the border were not only endorsed with a view to stability but also considered to be a proven means of ideological softening-up, if not of subversion.

The most opposition by the majority of the participants in the Wehrkunde congress was found by the contribution of Ehmke, deputy chairman of the social democratic parliamentary group of the FRG parliament in Bonn. Above all Senator Wilson reacted sharply to the lack of cooperation by Ehmke, who is known to have recommended that all proposals be examined for their technical, financial and operational possibilities but who has not supported any of them. His defensive attitude toward practically all technical progress with respect to military armament, which he wants to see on the shortest possible line of social control, met with a derisive American objection: in this way, Einstein would also have been hindered in the development of the theory of relativity.

Strangely enough, uncriticized was Ehmke's suggestion of an increase in the subjects covered in the arms-control negotiations with the Soviet Union, under which not only weapons would be discussed with it but also strategies. A glance in the military lexicon of the Warsaw Pact will show something about the substance of this proposal. In that of the military publishing house of the GDR, under the key word "surprise," one finds a statement of how with its help a relatively unprepared military adversary can be destroyed, forced into the defensive, or hindered in resisting: "Depending upon the objective and the forces employed, the element of surprise has a strategic, operational or tactical nature. In a war with missiles and nuclear weapons, the effectiveness of surprise will be greatest when the use of weapons of mass destruction is unexpected." But who reads that sort of thing anyway?

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MILITARY

AUSTRIA

#### ARMS, MUNITIONS INVENTORIES RISE AS FOREIGN MARKETS SHRINK

West Berlin TAGESSPIEGEL in German 14 Feb 86 p 3

[Article by Herbert Lucht: "150 Tanks Stockpiled in Austria: Controversy Over Arms Exports into Numerous Crisis Regions"]

[Text] Vienna, Feb 1986--The waves are rising and in Austria this, like everything else, has become a rather vehement and slightly ludicrous controversy: May the neutral Alpine republic export arms or not? It may. Switzerland and Sweden do it too. May it export to countries that--for whatever reason--are at loggerheads, at war or in a crisis situation? It may not, quite simply because a homemade law passed several years ago forbids it.

For years, however, this law has either been winked at or ignored or interpreted broadly and at best formally but generally capriciously. Deliveries can be made to Libya, even when Qadhdhafi is preparing to invade Chad, but not to Morocco. That is how it has been since 1977 and since then it has been loudly disputed. Loudest right now, when independent--meaning not favorable to the government--media have made a fuss about the biggest weapons deal of recent years, namely triangular transactions (again by way of Libya).

VOEST weapons, 600 heavy field howitzers with the appropriate ammunition, were, as they say, supposed to go to Iran. The first 40 had already landed in Tripoli in the fall of last year, marked for Iran but accepted by Austria for "ultimate use" in Libya. To be sure, however, there is substantial evidence--including VOEST negotiations in Teheran--that does not point to Libya at all. Only: Libya was already Austria's largest weapons customer in 1984. In any case, Qadhdhafi's purchase, valued at about 10 billion schillings, fills a highly explosive order book: 200 GHN howitzers, 200,000 ERFB HE demolition grenades, 100,000 PD-M fuzes, 100,000 M fuzes, 10,000 ERFB Smoke (WP) grenades, 20,000 MTSQ fuzes, 10,000 ERFB Illumination grenades, 200,000 pieces of HE 80 grenade launcher ammunition with fuzes, 500,000 pieces of HE 70 grenade launcher ammunition with fuzes, 100,000 pieces of HE 78 grenade launcher ammunition with fuzes, and 220,000 propellant charges. All of the abbreviations indicate standard NATO ammunition for grenade launchers or howitzers.

However that may be: after all that became known, Federal Chancellor Sinowatz immediately stopped weapons shipments to Qadhdhafi (and wherever they went

from there) but, just as in all the other scandals that have come to light recently, he also immediately assigned the blame to the media. And they, as in the case of the KURIER, defend themselves energetically: "Sinowatz thinks that we are losing the weapons deals because there is so much in the newspaper about them. That is laughable. The suspicion that VOEST guns had gone to Iran and Iraq had long since appeared in the international trade journals. When Sinowatz is given a hard time by the gentlemen of the nationalized weapons industry, he should not make a scapegoat out of the media."

But--as so often--Sinowatz is only annoyed and embarrassed, perhaps more than usual this time. For it is not just the press that is guilty, he sulks unmoved. Certainly the foreign competition played a role as well, something that would have to be proven. But in regard to the key word "competition": it is the reason why most leading politicians across the spectrum of Austrian parties are pleading for the acknowledgment of arms production as well, not strongly but somewhat clearly. The Weapons Shipments Law needs to be reformulated and exports organized "more liberally" than heretofore.

That, however, has already been rejected by Sinowatz. The sections, he says, are sufficient. But that is what it is all about, even if that is only the one side, the legal side. The Weapons Shipments Law, a work of Kreisky's personally motivated anger in his day, would truly be enough if one were to give it more content and clarity (even a loosening would promise precision). Journalists and lawyers criticize it for being deliberately watered-down. And if it remains in effect--and Sinowatz wants it to remain in effect for the sake of jobs--then there will not even be a discussion about the moral aspects.

Meanwhile, the warehouses are filling up with ammunition, grenades and howitzers and 150 tanks are stockpiled, unsold.

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MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

# RESERVE MOBILIZATION APPARATUS TACKLING ASSIGNMENT PROBLEMS

Bonn RHEINISCHER MERKUR/CHRIST UND WELT in German 1 Feb 86 p 2

[Article by Klaus Walther: "Soon, No More Rest in the Reserve"]

[Excerpt] What can reservists actually do that is meaningful? This is unfortunately no theoretical question. At work, reservists are often ridiculed when they go to report for duty. "Drinkercise," "poker training," or "Federal vacation" — such taunts evidence the public's bad image of exercises. There are too many bad examples.

The proprietor of a small mechanical shop was called up for a two-week training exercise, after having heard nothing from "the government" for 11 years. He had to go to Army aviation: he shut down his business(!) and was assigned a "specially responsible activity." He was ordered to flight-line equipment maintenance, and there specifically to hydraulic test apparatus. "The stuff was actually fine," he was able to report afterward. The master craftsman was all the same allowed to put new contacts on two distributors during the exercise. True, the responsible sergeant did come along first to ask, "You really know what you're doing there?"

One commander taking his evening walk got a real surprise. On the barracks square he confided to a fellow officer that he was looking for an English-speaking reservist for the operations office for an exercise then underway. All at once a private pulling sentry duty reported, perfect for the job. He turned out to be a college professor called up for training.

"The main problem is the deficient personnel and technical resources of the local Recruiting and Replacement Centers, which have to decide on how to utilize reservists," as the Reservist Association well understands. Too often "decisions go according to what's in the file." The files usually do not reflect the reservists' most recent state of professional development. And they would contain only a deficient summary of the military qualifications of former active-duty soldiers.

An Air Force exercise at Ulm-Leipheim proved there is a better way. Fighter-Bomber Wing 44 was transferred from Portugal to Swabia and was there staffed up more than 50 percent with reservists. They had been located and then requisitioned by means of painstaking detail-work at the local Recruiting and Replacement Centers. Thus it came to pass that an aircraft mechanic from the Dornier firm was utilized for maintenance of the very modern "Alpha-Jet" planes, and a meteorologist was available for the aviation meteorological service.

Problem number two is the social issue. While the reserve Lieutenant Colonel Uwe Stellmann, mentioned at the outset [not in this excerpt], who is a government employee in civilian life, did not have to put up with any disadvantages whatever, the situation shaped up quite differently for reserve private Joachim Diehl, an employee of a private firm. For having done his duty, he will later receive less pension, and he must reduce his personal budget by 10 percent for the period of the service, until he gets the money back in his next annual income-tax refund.

The man charged with reserve affairs for the Bundeswehr, General Heinz Kasch, is, as he says, "aware of the problems." On the Hardthöhe [Bundeswehr headquarters] and in the Finance Ministry, solutions are being sought. The Reserve Association has meanwhile had a study done. The result: a person with military service obligation who participates in training for 4 months in the course of 13 years, as prescribed in the basic military service law, and who earns an upper-middle-class income, will sacrifice 90 marks a month in social security when he retires. The cause is an obsolete pension-calculation model, which underinsures reservists as if they were draftees.

Problem number three consists of disadvantages for reservists in the workplace. "In my company no one grumbled when I was gone for 14 days," Johannes Diehl could still report in the fall, as he was going off to do his training. The usual attitude in business up to now, but it could change. Namely, if reservists were called up more often and at shorter intervals. Reserve-affairs director General Heinz Kasch says, "We will meet business half-way and exercise understanding in our planning where possible. But we cannot escape the need to take account of the changed requirements of the Bundeswehr."

Fritz-Heinz Himmelreich, deputy chief managing director of the Federal Union of German Employers Associations, does not hold with this. He recently demanded a stronger right of consultation for firms, when it comes to deciding whether or not an employee is indispensable for a military exercise. There seems to be material in abundance for intensive discussion between

business and employers [sic] if the risk is to be avoided that the simple fact of being a reservist could lead to a hiring preference for non-serving candidates.

It seems certain, nevertheless, that the primary burden will fall on the reservists themselves. For, in addition to the training exercises for which they must leave their workplace, there will in the future also be week-end training periods, from Friday evening to Sunday evening.

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MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

#### CIVIL DEFENSE COMPONENT SET WITHIN 'TOTAL DEFENSE' DOCTRINE

Bonn INFORMATION FUER DIE TRUPPE in German Aug 85 pp 16-38

[Article by Dr Werner Schmitt, director of Civil Defense Academy: "Civil Defense: Basic Principles and Importance for Security Policy"; first paragraph is INFORMATION FUER DIE TRUPPE introduction]

[Text] Civil defense is an integral component of overall defense but it is generally not nearly as well known as its military counterpart. The article on civil defense as published below is based upon a report given by Dr Schmitt, president of Civil Defense Academy, to the Bonn section of the Society for Military Science on 21 January 1985. The report was slightly reworked and abridged for editing reasons and provided with intermediate headings. The arguments are both a statement and a familiarization with this little-known material and its attendant circumstances as well as an enthusiastic pleading for civil defense.

#### Tasks of National Civil Defense

In the civilian area as well, we distinguish between national and NATO defense, whereby the main emphasis is on the national area.

Since as early as the beginning of the 1960's, national civil defense has been subdivided into four main groups:

- the maintenance of state and government functions,
- civilian defense,
- the supplying of the population and the armed forces, and
- the immediate support of the armed forces.

#### The Maintenance of State and Government Authority

This includes the maintenance of all three state functions, that is, legislation, government and administration, and the administration of justice.

It is of fundamental importance for overall defense, for neither civil nor military defense can function if one is not successful in keeping the necessary state authorities and especially the control installations intact during war as well. Here both administrative and legislative measures are required. Examples of the administrative area include the tightening of the civilian administrative organization, preparations for the formation of agency executive staffs, the setting up of protected headquarters, and the improvement and securing of command communications networks.

A subcase to be emphasized in the maintenance of government authority is the maintenance of public security and order; the problems occurring here--the control of refugees or the protection of facilities and installations, for example--have an immediate effect on the armed forces as well. Another special problem is the maintenance of the possibilities for information; contact with the population should not be interrupted in any phase of a crisis or war. Radio plays an outstanding role here.

### Civilian Defense


The second main functional area of national civil defense is civilian defense. The measures included here can be subdivided into two groups in accordance with their purpose:

The first group includes the measures that are to provide the people some preventive defense against the effects of war. This includes the warning service to warn the population--primarily through sirens--and the self-protection of the population and enterprises. It also includes the building of shelters and the regulation of the place of residence, both of which are of immediate importance for the armed forces as well.

In the scope of the regulation of the place of residence, the principle applied is that of "stay put." Even in war, most people are better off in their accustomed domestic environment, with the resources of their own household and in the vicinity of helpful neighbors. Exceptions to this rule may occur when, because of the specific situation or specific assumptions, the threat to the population in certain districts must be evaluated as so high that it outweighs the natural home advantage; in this case, evacuations could be ordered. In addition, undesired attempts to flee cannot be ruled out, despite the "stay put" principle. The corresponding precautions are necessary, not least in the interest of the operational freedom of the armed forces.

Shelters are the best protection against attempts to flee. Thus the building of shelters should be the core of civilian defense. In large areas outside of the core damage zones, countless people could be saved in a war if they had shelters. Unfortunately, however, shelters are not only the best but also the most expensive protection and thus to date no government and no parliament of the FRG has been able to find its way to a long-term obligation to construct protective shelters. But the experience of the last 15 years has been that voluntary action cannot lead to satisfactory results.

# Functional Diagram for the Warning Service--Basic Sketch for a Warning Area



## Key:

1. Air situation
2. NBC situation
3. Warning service liaison office
4. Warning service measuring points (unmanned)
5. Warning service control measuring points
6. Observation and NBC measuring points of the kreises and kreisless cities
7. NBC reporting and plotting centers of the kreises and kreisless cities
8. NBC reporting stations of the Military Region Command
9. Warning Office--Central Coverage and Evaluation of the Air and NBC Situation

10. Federal Government (ZALM)
11. Neighbor warning offices
12. Land government
13. Weather services
14. NBC reporting center of the military district command
15. Warning service in neighboring NATO country
16. VHF broadcasting transmitter
17. Wire warning network--telephone lines of the German Federal Post Office
18. Local Warning Service
19. Radio
20. Warning centers
21. Sirens

The second group of civilian-defense measures includes those that are to mitigate or eliminate damage when such damage does occur in spite of the protective measures. These rescue measures include the development of disaster protection with auxiliary organizations such as the fire department, Red Cross, Technical Emergency Service, etc. on the one hand and public health on the other. In both areas, disaster protection and public health, the corresponding potentials are already being made available by the federal Laender for peacetime necessities and disasters. These potentials are also available in a national defense emergency but for the special requirements of this case they are expanded, supplemented and specialized by the Federal Government. Thus the Federal Government delivers special equipment to the auxiliary organizations of disaster protection, provides additional training for their units, and even sets up its own special units. In the area of health precautions, the Federal Government has, for example, prepared hospitals with more than 85,000 beds and stockpiled medical supplies for 250,000 injured.

### Supply

The third main complex of functional tasks of national civil defense concerns supply: supplying the population, civilian operational units, armed forces and other public and private users and the material supplying with goods and services as well as the covering of the necessary personnel requirement. Examples of individual measures include measures to stockpile and ration food, water, mineral oil and energy; the development of an efficient repair service; the meshing of the communications network; the preparation of the establishment of motor convoys; administrative measures for the management of the means of transport and traffic routes; etc.

### The Support of the Armed Forces

The fourth main functional area of national civil defense relates to the support of the armed forces. This means the following:

- that the civilian area must provide personnel and material to the armed forces as a mobilization augmentation,
- that it has important tasks in supplying the troop with foodstuffs and military hardware,
- that it must do extensive work in the area of transport and communications,
- that roads must be kept open for assembly and
- that movements of refugees must be prevented or controlled.

#### NATO Civil Defense

Initially it is necessary to point out an essential difference relative to military NATO defense. For whereas the latter is characterized by the principle of integration, in the civilian area the member countries remain completely independent and thus have unrestricted responsibility for their own actions. To be sure, NATO civil defense also has its organization: peacetime committees that deal with overlapping questions of traffic, supply and civilian defense and so-called NATO war offices in the state of alert and war that must also solve questions of traffic and supply as well as those of the border-crossing control of refugees. But both in the committees and in principle in the war offices, the delegates of the sovereign member nations are national representatives responsible only to their respective governments. Accordingly, there are, as a rule, no majority decisions made either here or there but only unanimous resolutions of all those involved. And even these unanimous resolutions represent only recommendations for the member nations; whether and how they are implemented remains at the discretion of the national governments.

The authority of the civilian entities of the alliance is therefore very limited. The commissions already in existence in peacetime have responsibility for:

1. The exchange of information,
2. The attempt to coordinate the various civil-defense preparations in the member countries,
3. The planning of measures that by their nature can be resolved only in the cooperation of all or several member nations (for example: planning for alliance crisis management or for the establishment and activation of civilian NATO war offices).

The NATO war offices, which are activated only in a state of emergency, have in principle functions similar to those of the committees but they also mainly perform tasks comparable to those of clearing offices. Thus they link countries having certain requirements with other countries that can meet these



needs and, in a suitable manner, they also organize transport that may involve more than one continent. In principle, however, they have no directive authority.

After all of this, it is no wonder that civil defense within the scope of NATO defense is often seen as only secondary. This, of course, is not satisfactory. Nor is it from the viewpoint of the military. For in an emergency, the military also depends upon communications and supply, two functions that--because of a lack of integration of logistics in NATO--must be handled by national civilian authorities, that is, within the scope of NATO civil defense.

From the overall view of the national and NATO tasks of civil defense, it is clear that their range extends far beyond civilian defense or even civil air defense. The conceptual basis of all planning is the consideration

1. that the nuclear inferno--so stubbornly conjured up by the opponents of civil defense--represents only one of several conceivable war scenarios, even a rather improbable one, for a number of reasons;
2. that every conflict limited in terms of weapons employment, firepower, space or time, as terrible as it may be, leaves opportunities to protect large parts of the population, to supply them and to carry out other planned and necessary civil defense measures; and
3. that these opportunities can be increased substantially and in part multiplied by taking the proper precautions.

#### Security Policy and Civil Defense

With respect to an external threat, the goal of our security policy is:

- to ensure the continuation of the state, its independence and its internal order
- and to protect the freedom of citizens in particular, their physical integrity and their rights.

The main features of Western and thus West German security policy as well can be summarized in the pair of concepts of the "securing of the peace"--presently mainly in relation to politics and diplomacy--on the one hand and "vigilance and defense readiness" on the other.

The highest value is thereby given to the securing of the peace. The main instruments of this first component of security policy are:

- the maintenance of a balance of forces,
- the limitation and control of the armaments of all countries,
- detente, that is, the gradual reduction of the East-West antagonism, and

--the renunciation of the first use of weapons.

The second component of our security policy--"vigilance and defense readiness"--is necessary, because it is precisely the determination and defense capability that links the aggressive intentions of a potential enemy with an uncalculable risk and that in just this way can give the necessary emphasis to the efforts for compromise and peace. It is only secondarily that vigilance and defense readiness are needed, because no one can guarantee that the striving to maintain the peace will be successful and because it is also true that we do not want to give up our freedom and independence in the event that the policy of peace fails.

In the foreground, then, is deterrence. It is thereby clear that the peace and defense components of security policy are not unrelated but combine to form a unified logical strategy.

To be sure, civil defense is also somewhat involved in the principle of the balance of forces but its predominant importance is in the efforts for vigilance and defense readiness. For vigilance and defense readiness also require the contribution of civil defense.

#### Civil Defense in the Case of Crisis

Deterrence plays an important role in the overcoming of crises. But deterrence presupposes a credible defense capability. Here civil defense is needed as well. It is thereby a matter not only of the civilian share in the establishment of full defense readiness but also a matter of the preservation of the internal stability of the nation.

This internal stability can be endangered by a number of circumstances:

--The public, for example, reacts to international tensions with alarm, which, by way of fear and panic, can reach the point where people want to flee.

--It can come to bottlenecks in the provision of foodstuffs and economic goods, and the public could react by hoarding.

--Without being discrimination, 4.7 million foreigners likewise represent an uncertainly factor. Many of them, especially those liable to military service, will want to go home and that means not only the loss of important manpower but also an additional load on traffic routes and the means of transport during a critical time.

--The last and most important example: in crisis situations, we must expect subversive actions: agitation against our defense resolve, possibly wildcat--that is, illegal--strikes, increased espionage, sabotage and terror.

Precisely this last example, by the way, makes clear the extension and intensification of the methods for settling international conflicts during recent decades. Previously an enemy beyond the borders was satisfied with

pursuing his objectives through diplomatic and military pressure. Today it is quite self-evident that one must also expect an internal threat by a foreign enemy, who will seek to shake the internal stability of the nation that he is fighting. Threat situations that were originally attributable to the classical area of domestic policy are today often enough the initiated and planned part or the preparation for an attack from outside; corrective measures from the arsenal of domestic policy have thus become an instrument of the externally-directed security policy.

What else belongs to internal stability can be seen in a systematic breakdown. Internal security includes

--organizational stability (with the key words constitutional order and public security);

--economic stability;

--political stability, which requires state authorities with the ability to act and far-reaching agreement by the large state-supporting groups in vital national questions, including the fundamentals of security policy;

--psychological or intellectual stability, which can be described using the catchwords defense resolve and defense commitment, and

--social stability, ensuring that social conflicts can be avoided or settled in a suitable manner.

A central function of civil defense is to handle all of these challenges to internal stability while in a crisis. Not much can be done here with military means: if the civilian efforts are unsuccessful and if the subversive actions lead to disruption and paralysis domestically, for example, or if the will of the people to assert themselves breaks down, then there is a danger that the basis of defense, overall defense, will be destroyed without a single shot being fired. It is precisely for this reason, however, that the conscious attack against our domestic stability must be considered more likely than an actual hot war with the great risks for the aggressor or even escalation to a nuclear conflict.

The ensuring of internal stability is not the only challenge to civil defense in the scope of crisis management. If the crisis also includes an acute military threat or if the crisis gradually leads to such a threat, then the civilian side is also needed in bringing about full defense readiness. Since in peacetime defense readiness cannot constantly be maintained at the highest level, it must be increased abruptly in time of crisis. In the military area, the means for this are mobilization and deployment. In the civilian area, substantially more must still be done in accordance with an alarm plan to adapt the entire administration, the economy and public life to the requirements of a threatening national defense emergency. This requires measures to adapt administration to the changed tasks during crises and war, to control the economic potential for the purpose of optimum utilization for defense purposes, to activate all planning for the protection of the population, etc. And of course the measures for the establishment of full

defense readiness on the civilian side also include those measures that are necessary and provided for in accordance with our list of tasks for civilian support in the establishment of military defense readiness.

Each of the two functional areas, the securing of internal stability and the establishment of full defense readiness, serves the typical double purpose for our security policy: on the one hand, the political demonstration of the defense capability and the defense resolve so as to be able to influence the fateful question of "war or peace" through credible deterrence and, on the other hand, the taking of precautions in case crisis management fails.

Deterrence and readiness--internally or externally--are closely related functionally. From here, the short path leads directly to the crucial switch that decides between detente and war.

#### Civil Defense in the Case of War

In case of war, what was prepared during the long peacetime period for this event would have to stand the test. The civilian contribution to overall defense, which would then be called upon, follows from the list of tasks presented at the outset. Broken down by functions, it is:

--maintenance of internal stability,

--maintenance of full defense readiness as established in the crisis and alarm phase,

--protection of the population, including welfare and supply; the humanitarian task then, whose successful accomplishment--at least in essence--is the real reason for overall defense.

In this phase as well, the contribution of civil defense serves to pursue those goals that have been made the basis of our security policy for the case of war: to limit damage and to restore deterrence to pave the way for a political solution to the conflict.

#### Overall Defense

Civil defense is an indispensable component of overall defense--indispensable not only for the people that it is supposed to protect but also for the troop. Civil and military defense presuppose one another; the one is the correlate of the other. Only together do the two form a self-contained and effective whole--overall defense--and military and civil defense have in fact long been interwoven and have grown together, not just in theory but also in their practical measures.

The consequence of this knowledge lies in the recognition of the fundamental equality of the two defense areas. It is regrettable that in practice this rule is often not considered or is not given adequate consideration, especially with respect to political identification and financial support. By



the way, this fact must be regrettable for both sides of overall defense but this really changes nothing.

With so much relevance for security policy, the natural question is what civil defense can do and how it is fulfilling its assigned tasks within the scope of overall defense. To be fair, it must be pointed out that civil defense, civilian management and the civilian political authorities are more involved in the social, administrative and political structures of our republic than is the military and accordingly they are largely dependent upon these structures. The following chapter deals with the resulting general conditions, some of which are also significant for the military while others are important only for the civilian side.

### The Constitutional Bases of Civil Defense

In regard to crises and war, the basic constitutional order of the FRG has been significantly shaped by the so-called emergency constitution of 1968, that is, through the amendment of the constitution at that time in regard to the handling of cases of crisis or war.

In this subject, three basic principles of the constitution are relevant:

- the guarantee of basic constitutional rights;
- the system of the separation of powers, including an effective parliamentary and constitutional control of the executive branch, and
- the federalist structure of our political system.

The basic constitutional rights manifest how liberal our basic system is. Apart from insignificant extensions of possibilities for restrictions already in existence, the emergency constitution has made possible only one additional limitation of basic rights worth mentioning: the limitation of the right of free choice of a workplace and of inclusion in the work process in general. At least in principle, all other basic rights remain untouched even under emergency conditions, especially the basic rights of freedom of assembly, the freedom to associate, and the freedom of opinion and of the press. That means, for example, that the right to strike will continue unchanged in time of war and will be also in effect for those required to work. That also means that there will be no press censorship and that here--in the case of news of importance for defense, for example--we will rely on the voluntary self-restraint of the press. And neither will the constitutional right of citizens to appeal to the courts against any measure by public authority be affected.

Neither will there be any change in the second constitutional principle, that of the separation of powers, in time of crisis or war. In principle in all emergency situations, the Bundestag [lower house of FRG parliament] and Bundesrat [upper house of FRG parliament] retain all of the rights that they have today. This flows from the primacy of policy and is nothing short of an essential element of the concept behind the emergency constitution. With Article 80a of the constitution, the right of the Bundestag to control the



government is even strengthened. Only if and as long as the Bundestag is unable to work because of the external circumstances in a national defense emergency does the Joint Committee--a small but for precisely this reason rather stable emergency parliament--supersede it and the Bundesrat. Under the concept of the constitution, the constitutional body "parliament" is therefore always able to act and always competent. There is no transfer of parliamentary powers to the executive branch in the state of emergency either.

In particular cases, the solutions that have been found--right to strike, freedom of the press, Article 80a, etc.--can be bothersome and will not satisfy everyone. But they are a compromise between the emergency precautions on the one hand and the observance of the basic principles essential for a liberal parliamentary democracy on the other hand. The will of the provider of the constitution--originally worked out very laboriously but ultimately supported by the majority--demands respect here.

The third constitutional principle with relevance in an emergency is the federative structure of the state. Three autonomous authorities--the Federal Government, the Laender, and the municipalities--stand side by side in our country. With the administrative districts, the kreises and communities, there are even five administrative levels. In peacetime, there is no general chain of command from the top to the bottom as in the military area. The Federal Government also normally lacks sufficient legislative competencies for matters of importance to defense.

Here, to be sure, the emergency constitution has undertaken some corrections. For in a national defense emergency, and certainly only then, the Federal Government receives an unlimited directive authority over all agencies of the Laender and municipalities as well as a comprehensive right of legislation that is no longer limited to certain matters. But the federative principle per se remains untouched even in a national defense emergency.

#### The Administrative Organization

The organizational structures that are to be found in a comparison of the Federal Laender as well as within the individual Laender are extremely numerous. This makes the work in civilian administration quite difficult even in peacetime and naturally could also affect the speed, effectiveness and uniformity of administrative action in an emergency.

And the fact that in principle the tasks of civil defense are not being handled by its own agencies (as in the Bundeswehr of Bundeswehr administration) but are assigned to administrative agencies already in existence that were once established for completely other purposes has important consequences for civil defense. This "sub-tenant-role" results, for example, in:

--the splitting of the tasks of civil defense into a number of departments;

--the performance of these tasks by agencies that, in accordance with the preponderance of their functions, concentrate on completely different, namely

peacetime, objectives and therefore frequently perceive the civil defense tasks as functional and psychological foreign bodies.

In general, it must be stated that in an emergency civilian administration must do some substantial reorganization and regrouping precisely in the organizational and personnel area. For many peacetime tasks can and must be dropped in an emergency, whereas others--those important for defense--are completely new (as, for example, the food and economic offices) or in any case demand a higher priority (as, for example, the offices for civilian defense and public security).

Especially these last examples make clear that the leap of civilian administration from the state of peace to complete defense readiness is longer, more difficult and more precarious than in the military area, which from the start is completely prepared for this transition.

The possibilities for relieving the named difficulties are limited and therefore must be used more thoroughly:

One should advance as many of the necessary defense measures as possible to the preliminary phase of a crisis or even to normal peacetime.

More important is the thorough preparation of the necessary organizational, personnel and material measures by administration. What has not been prepared does not work in an emergency.

Finally, the training of the planned personnel is closely tied to careful administrative preparation. Here the Civil Defense Academy also has an important function to perform.

#### Other General Conditions

Among some other general conditions that must be understood are:

--the defense geographic position of our country, which, in the event of a war in central Europe, would be the theater of the first defensive operations with all of their effects on the civilian population and which also would be largely dependent upon the other allies not only militarily but also economically;

--the liberal structure of our national economy with the principle of supply and demand, division of labor, technological sophistication, automation, economic concentration and the dependence of all production upon countless suppliers--all developments that could produce problems under defense viewpoints;

--the narrow financial framework: it puts pressure mainly on civil defense, for the ratio of the budget of civil defense to that of military defense is 1:60, even though NATO considers a ratio of 1:20 for appropriate;

--the mental and psychological situation in our country.

The upshot is that in the overall political and social view defense and especially civil defense must deal with quite a number of basic data from the outside. Many of these factors cannot be changed and we do not want to change others--our free market system, for example--but we must orient ourselves to these basic conditions and therefore be aware of them.

#### Status of Civil Defense

The state of readiness of civil defense is not uniform. There are weaknesses that in an emergency can only be overcome through redoubled efforts, much imagination and above all improvisation. At the same time, there are areas in which the measures have made more progress than even interested observers suppose. The result of years of work by officials of the Federal Government, Länder and municipalities familiar with civil defense tasks should not be underestimated, nor should one overlook the contribution of the many voluntary helpers who have put themselves in the service of civilian defense in particular. On the whole, civil defense is capable of making the necessary contribution that can reasonably be expected, although not for all areas.

A planned amendment to the Civilian Defense Law is to bring some improvements:

- an adaptation of civil service law to emergency requirements,
- regulation of civilian defense health needs, something that has been lacking for years,
- the establishment of compulsory service in civilian defense,
- a requirement for protective shelters in new dwellings.

Precisely this last item would be an extraordinary gain not only for humanitarian civilian defense but also for overall defense.

To be sure, the psychological environment for such projects is difficult and essentially this can be attributed to three reasons:

1. to an underdeveloped state consciousness and an inadequate understanding of democracy explainable through the historical development of our people;
2. to the view that any defense is ineffective anyway in a nuclear age and therefore senseless;
3. to the revolt against the consequences of a war with the instinctive attempt to repress all related questions.

Even more than military defense, civil defense lacks a stable and broad psychological backing. In recent times, some critics have even held the view that a protected population makes it appear possible to wage war and actually induces one to try it. The concept of the hostage function of the population, a perversion of security policy considerations, is prevalent. As though a war

between the large political blocs in the world depended upon the protection or nonprotection of the West German population; as though it were actually a matter of such considerations of the attacked rather than of the potential attacker (who, by the way, manages a rather effective civilian defense without being scolded for it); and as though our government did not know and has not taken into account that a war would claim many victims even with optimum protective measures.

Where there are breaches in defense readiness, it is a matter of nothing less than mental or psychological stability in the sense of the internal stability of our political system. In the meantime, it should be clear that the potential enemy is purposefully using the undermining of defense morale as a weapon. The urgency of addressing the resulting questions is obvious.

To bring about a fundamental change is a difficult task, however:

First on this path must be the striving for a new recognition of the positive values of our basic system. Even if there is loud resistance, our young people above all must be made more aware that our present political system with all of its blemishes and all of the human weaknesses of its representatives provides a degree of freedom that we have never before had in German history, a free, democratic and constitutional system that in any case should appear to a wide majority of our people to be worthy of being defended--internally and externally.

Second is a comprehensive and understandable clarification of the facts that are the basis for our security policy and our defense concept.

Third, we need a credible, unequivocal and objectively convincing identification of those responsible, especially the politicians, with the security concepts that are found correct; not only from individuals but from all those having responsibility for this in the Federal Government and Laender, in parliaments and governments.

On the basis of such an honest and courageous strategy, an increased understanding could also be gained for civil defense. Since in broad areas civil defense must not be seen as a state task, what it needs above all is the active participation of the population itself. The point of departure in the necessary rethinking must be the knowledge of the strategic importance of civil defense in the structure of overall defense--a civil defense that must make a contribution not only to the establishment and maintenance of defense readiness but also to crisis management and thus to securing the peace.

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MILITARY

GREECE

BRIEFS

AIRCRAFT INVENTION OVERLOOKED--A Greek invention is left to rot in bureaucrats' drawers and the country will pay hard currency to purchase the "idea" from abroad. The system has been invented by an active duty officer of the Air Force and makes possible the resupply of planes and helicopters with sea or fresh water while in flight. This officer submitted a confidential report to the Ministry of National Defense and the GEA [Air Force General Staff] in 1983, according to which this invention facilitates the resupply of fire-extinguishing aircraft and presents many possibilities for its use by various types of planes and helicopters in the Greek Air Force. Moreover, the system can be produced by one of the Greek arms industries, its cost is advantageous, and its production will save money and time. It could also be exported, to produce immediate financial advantages for the country. However, as far as we know, these plans remain abandoned somewhere, while a similar system was presented last year in England during an air and space exhibit by the firm "Masters of the World," which aroused great interest. Poland and Canada were especially interested, and these are the markets from which Greece purchases most of its fire-extinguishing air equipment, etc. This means that these countries will soon sell us a British invention similar to the Greek one which is being ignored for unknown reasons. [Excerpt] [Athens ETHNOS in Greek 23 Mar 86 p 5] /6091

CSO: 3521/121



MILITARY

NORWAY

# FOREIGN AFFAIRS EXPERT ASSESSES USSR FORCES ACROSS BORDER

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 12 Mar 86 p 2

[Article by John Berg: "Soviet Forces in the North"]

[Text] In all areas where the development is rapid situations arise which require new ways of looking at matters. This is not unknown to the media, which themselves are in the midst of such a situation. Nor should it be unknown in security policy since history can point to many and dramatic examples.

But in the Norway of today recognition that the Soviets' armament has entered a new phase which requires new viewpoints nevertheless seems to be come very slowly. Many Norwegian descriptions of the Soviets' forces in our close vicinity remind us today of a statement that "Hansen has bought four tires, a steering wheel, an engine" etc. where it is overlooked that Hansen actually bought a car. It is overlooked that counting divisions in the Leningrad military district no longer reflects the Soviet organizational structure with which Norway is confronted. This leads to wrong conclusions, among others that there is some meaning in the term "nuclear-free zone" and that the Norwegian defense efforts can still be formulated on the premises of the 1970s.

## The Military

It is the security politicians who are lagging behind. The Norwegian military is well informed of the development and has certainly formed its own opinion on what this entails. But when Norwegian military chiefs are to give a presentation and inform, they have a tendency to imitate the security politicians in their use of words and mode of presentation. Thus they often veil their own message. The chief command of the Defense still lacks an information organ which can be based on the military's own ground and identify which problems have not yet been expressed, in order to translate the military's opinion into words and phrases which can take root and affect the basic approach to military reality.

In addition we should abolish the odd tradition that the political leadership of the Defense comes out with evaluations of the purely military development. The politicians are not professional military personnel. In this area they should be content with a critical dialogue with the military. Look at Sweden.

## The Operational Theatre

The point of the matter is that counting divisions does not tell us the crucial points regarding the Soviets' operational patterns in a war. Thus, we just need to study the operative organizational structure; and it is in this area that dramatic events have happened with the Soviets in the past few years:

Some of the ground forces in the Leningrad military district have been gathered in an army, while the remaining divisions will be distributed among two army corps, which thus will also be able to operate as armies. But even if this is often overlooked in Norwegian presentations it is old news and only the "insides" in the organization we have to react to.

The command and support elements in the area tell us that perhaps all these three armies will go in one front. Such a front is not what we associate with a "front line".

The front is the Soviet army's basic operative unit. We can call the front in our vicinity "Arctic Front". The name "Northern Front" is taken up by the northernmost front in Central Europe, which is presumably aimed at Northern Germany, Denmark and in the next round Southern Norway. A "Sweden Front" is also conceivable in the area. But we still have not come to the point.

In the 1980s a Soviet military technology in rapid progress has made it possible for the Soviets to raise their operative planning to a new level, above the front level. All of Europe is now divided into three operational theatres, which many Norwegian military personnel like to describe with the telling Soviet technical term "strategic directions". Norway is located in the aim of such a "strategic direction", i.e. the operational theatre North-West.

It is the objective of an operational theatre to be able to amass very large ground, air and naval forces in fast and precisely coordinated fighting operations. And here we have come to the point.

The Soviet military leaders can do no magic. New organizational forms do not give the planes a longer reach and the combat vehicles a faster cruising speed. But it is a basic fact which is often overlooked by Western census takers of divisions that again and again throughout history new organizational and operational forms made it possible to gather with lightning speed and win while the losing side can be left with partly large forces placed at a wrong location. A good example of what the new situation entails is that the Soviet have gathered their long- and medium-range fighters in five huge airforce armies with headquarters in Legnica, Vinnitsa, Smolensk, Moscow and Irkutsk. This provides the possibility of amassing very large air forces against one area one day, and against a completely different one the following day. The reader can find several details of the "strategic direction/operational theatre North-West in the author's book "Threat against Norway" (University Publishing House 1984).

The first thing we have to do in the Norwegian debate is to realize that the operations of the Soviet Northern fleet will be integrated into the new structure. To discuss naval exercises and Norwegian-Allied efforts without facing this is to turn one's back to the reality of the 1980s. We must further listen very closely to what the military has to tell us regarding the development. The security politicians have not told us anything. The military on its part should reevaluate their information style.

12831

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MILITARY

SPAIN

# CIVIL DEFENSE EVACUATION PLANS LACKING FOR MADRID

Madrid EPOCA in Spanish 10-16 Mar 86 pp 48-52

[Article by Juan Carlos Sainz de Ayala: "If Madrid Had To Be Evacuated"]

[Text] The possibility of a mass evacuation of a great metropolis such as Madrid must never be ruled out or taken with the casualness exhibited by government agencies on which such a decision and implementation would depend. The Spanish Civil Protection agency itself defines as a risk "the possibility that something might occur to endanger the lives or property of the citizens." Catastrophe is interpreted as a "risk that might affect a community of persons or property and requiring the coordinated intervention of all resources available to the respective government agencies."

Such a catastrophe would be fought on three fronts: Prevention, in order to limit the consequences; planning of particular types of action for every case; and the coordination and synchronization by one command center of the different services that must move into action in an emergency. The continuing action of public bodies is aimed at the study of situations of grave risk and the protection and rescue of persons and property in cases where such situations occur." So much for the theory, always explicit and effective, which fills pamphlets and manuals and justifies dozens of government paying spectacular salaries! But when we tried to ascertain whether they truly function, we came away with more than one surprise.

## Total Ignorance

We began our work at the Government Delegation in Madrid, continuing with the General Directorate of Police and the Ministries of Interior and Defense. It was necessary to begin at the bottom in order to discover whether each one of these organizations had clear and specific guidelines permitting rapid, well-organized action, free of any improvisation. But we always obtained the same response: "Evacuation? What strange things you newsmen dream up! Naturally, we have no such thing here. Nevertheless, go to Civil Protection to see whether they know anything." It was even hinted that "perhaps it would be better not to publish anything about this. The people get very nervous, you know." We were off to a good start for the peace and tranquillity of all Madrid residents, and our findings would apply to any Spanish city whose situation and peculiarities might involve any kind of risk. So we went to Civil Protection.

Once at the office of the director general, Antonio Figueruelo Almazan, we did nothing more than present a hypothetical situation which, although little likely, was nevertheless very real, one implying the possible evacuation of Madrid residents: A terrorist commando group armed with a homemade atomic bomb would threaten to destroy the city if his nonsensical demands were not met. However, we could have used other causes, such as floods, earthquakes, epidemics, poisoning of the water, and so on. His response could not have been more categorical: "First of all, I wish to make it clear that I do not believe it proper to point out the weak points of a society. There are too many lunatics who are increasingly well-equipped from a technical standpoint to give them any more ideas. Furthermore, the truth is that there are no plans for a real or theoretical case such as the one you are presenting. They did exist in the 1960's, in the midst of the cold war: the PIE or Initial Evacuation Plan, worked out by the military. But it is now obsolescent and unworkable. Nothing similar has been done since. But I can tell you this: To evacuate Madrid in an orderly fashion in the case of emergency is materially impossible. Incredible, but true. The Security Forces will await orders from those who should have everything worked out ahead of time, but there is one small, insignificant detail: Nothing has been planned. This ostrichlike attitude could mean thousands of deaths during the early hours of panic, when the masses, feeding on rumors, would go out into the streets.

#### CONEMRAD

Impossible? Let us think for a minute about what would happen. In the case of nuclear attack by missiles (let us remember that several warheads are continuously aimed at Spain and other European nations), there would scarcely be minutes to react. Evacuation in such a case is impossible and even counter-productive. The most logical thing to do would be to alert the population so that the people might go to underground shelters, apartments or subway tunnels. The government has the CONEMRAD communications system by means of which it can interrupt any television or radio broadcast in the country and transmit any news bulletin from a central command post controlled by army. Studies have shown that if the population of Hiroshima had been warned of the nuclear explosion only 5 minutes ahead of time, there would have been up to 80 percent fewer victims. But if one had hours or even several days, what would happen?

#### Theoretical Evacuation

Such a plan should consider that only 30 percent of the population could leave in their own vehicles, carrying everything essential to their own survival. The rest -- and one must think of the sick, disabled, elderly and children -- would have to be evacuated by other means. One would have to requisition all public and private buses and trucks, make maximum use of railroads and planes, taking the people to places far from the downtown area by massive use of the subway. The maximum number of persons would have to be gotten out and... taken where? One would first have to have readied shelters with provisions in the form of food, water and medicine. Such large-scale planning would require clear guidelines and the joint, coordinated action of all security forces, not to mention the countless civilian volunteers. Civil Protection would -- at least theoretically and on paper -- have drawn up a plan, but it is clear that it has not even thought of such a thing.



## Masses and Panic Equal Chaos

The mobilization of masses is in itself a difficult and complicated task because of the need to channel them. Under normal conditions and with the time necessary, a demonstration, soccer game or the morning traffic made up of thousands of cars in Madrid can be controlled if there is previous planning anticipating the needs of the masses before, during and after the transfer. And not only their needs, but also the unforeseen events and complications that might arise. The key to success is perfect planning and the establishment of order making the practical realization of plans possible. The individual then ceases to be a personal entity and becomes part of that depersonalized mass obeying the established order.

However, there is one factor that undoes all plans, making the masses uncontrollable: panic. Imagine that shots are fired during a demonstration of thousands of persons, that the steps of a soccer stadium are set on fire or that the traffic lights go out in a city at 7:00 in the morning. One's individuality is then reasserted in the search for one's own salvation, a way out at all costs, no matter who is hurt. Chaos is the certain result, in recent events causing more victims than those that instigated it.

Let us suppose for a moment that such a plan truly existed, with all its parts worked out in detail. Would it work? There are opinions on all sides, but they do not hold up under the slightest logical analysis. Assuming an alarm as the result of a situation of high risk to the population, one would have to have several hours to put the plan into operation and this with the cooperation of volunteers. But would there be any? Normally, each one would first save his family and himself at any cost. As far as the security forces are concerned, they are made up of persons with families in danger and with weapons which at any given moment they might use on those obstructing the path of escape to their own salvation. How many would remain at their posts? What about the buses, trucks, the subway? Who would drive them? One would have to assume a high sense of sacrifice in each of the drivers who would leave with their vehicles loaded and return to the center of danger to pick up more people.

The departure of automobiles would be chaotic and a time would come when all roads would be blocked, especially at intersections and streets carrying the heaviest traffic. Chaos and panic would cancel out the effectiveness of police officers and the army itself, which would have to impose order -- that is, if anyone were left in the barracks! Total chaos. One has but to think how it is returning to Madrid under normal conditions when there is no fear or panic involved. Furthermore, ways out of a city such as Madrid do not present the conditions necessary for such an evacuation, nor were emergency situations taken into account even remotely when they were planned: bottlenecks, merging traffic, and so on. Even with one-way traffic out, the avalanche could not be avoided.

Another problem to be solved would be the hordes of looters fonder of stealing than of their own lives, who would proceed on the basis of "just in case it does not happen" and make off with anything they could get their hands on.

Disorder, theft, murder: One has but to think of the famous blackouts in New York to realize the dangers of an uncontrollable mass facing an abnormal situation.

#### European Solutions

In other countries such as Switzerland, citizen and government consciousness has reached such a state that there are at present 4.25 million places for refugees for a population of 6 million! Planning is so effective that in 10 minutes, over 90 percent of the population could be safe in a shelter. Regular civil protection personnel total 625,000. During the 20 years from 1970 to 1990, 3,500 pesetas per person per year will have been spent. If Spain wanted to reach that level, it would have to spend the insane sum of 140 billion a year for 20 years. Let us note that the Spanish Civil Protection investment budget for this fiscal year amounts to 400 million.

We are European, but only for some things. In other areas, we are on a par with Ethiopia. And if Civil Protection itself accepts that the best means to fight catastrophes is to foresee them and plan possible solutions so that the bull does not gore us, then let us proceed to plan! Just because there are no clouds in the sky today does not mean that it will not rain tomorrow, because the fact is that now, today, we have no other recourse but to commend ourselves to Santa Rita and be caught having confessed our sins, with the blessing of the Civil Protection!

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MILITARY

SWEDEN

# INTEGRATION OF CIVIL, MILITARY EFFORTS IN 'TOTAL DEFENSE'

Bonn INFORMATION FUER DIE TRUPPE in German Aug 85 pp 51-65

[Article by Comm Egbert Thomer (Reserve): "Neutral but Armed - Sweden's Civilian and Military Defense Efforts"]

[Text] "To protect and save lives," is the motto of the Swedish civil defense service, which is sustained by 200,000 men and women. In the event of tension, large and medium-sized towns are evacuated; 5.5 million sheltered seats in underground bunkers are available to the remaining workers. Then the statement that "a country goes underground" becomes appropriate. Full protection is ensured for 8.4 million Swedes. In times of peace the shelters are opened extensively to civilian use, such as garages, multipurpose halls and sports facilities. An example of this is Stockholm's Katarina bunker which can accommodate 25,000 people.

The measures for applied defense readiness in all spheres are taken very seriously. According to a survey, 85 percent of the total population regard the Soviet Union's armament activities as an expression of a serious threat. The submarine incidents by Soviet units in Swedish territorial waters have contributed considerably to this attitude. Monitoring and defense preparations on the 1,600-kilometer-long Baltic coast are thus being permanently supported.

## The Armed Forces

In the event of mobilization, Sweden's total armed forces comprise 850,000 men, including the home guard with 110,000 volunteers and 30,000 members of installation defense units. All of the units of total defense are operationally ready 72 hours after mobilization. A few hours are sufficient for the local home guard units of 100 men to report for duty at designated positions. Every home guardsman has his equipment, along with weapon and ammunition, in his clothes closet. The heavy gear is stored in central depots. In peacetime, only 18,200 professional officers and 24,000 civil servants belong to the active units of army, air force, navy and coastal artillery. Added to that are 11,700 reserve officers who perform armed forces duty. Every year 50,000 recruits are called up for basic military service for between eight and nine months. Specialists have to serve from 10 to 15

months. Universal compulsory military service includes all male citizens between the ages of 18 and 47. Parallel to that, there is civil defense obligation for men and women between the ages of 16 and 65. In the event of mobilization, the ground forces comprise four armored brigades, 20 infantry brigades and four Norrland Brigades. Added to that are 50 independent infantry, artillery and antiaircraft battalions. There are 100 independent battalions and from 400 to 500 independent companies available in the 26 local defense districts. There are four defense regions with 15 districts in the coastal section. All of Sweden is divided into six military regions and the Gotland Military Command. The entire armed forces (army, navy, air force) are subordinate to the respective military region commander, who can act independently and decide on points of concentration in accordance with defense strategy requirements.

#### Organization and Equipment

The Norrland Brigades (5,500) with brigade headquarters, and headquarters and reconnaissance company, are elite units. In addition to three rifle battalions, the brigade includes an assault-gun company, an artillery battalion, an engineer and supply battalion each, as well as an antiaircraft battery. The type STRV-103 S turretless battle tanks, which are integrated into the armored battalions, are being modernized at present. They are getting diesel engines and laser rangefinders. The 39-ton vehicle is equipped with a 105-mm gun. There are also infantry gun carriers (IVK-91), STRV-101's (Centurions) and armored personnel carriers (PBV-302) on hand. The 155-mm automatic cannon developed by Bofors received much attention abroad. All combat units are equipped with armor-piercing weapons. The RBS-70 missile system, which can be employed in a one-man operation, is used for low-altitude air defense. Its advanced development into a night combat weapon has now been introduced.

The elongated country (the greatest north-south extension is 1,600 kilometers) lies under the "STRIL-60" shield, a semiautomatic electronic system used as an aircraft warning and fighter control system. Units of the air force (peacetime size: 9,600 professional and long-term military men, as well as 4,600 conscripts) are based at the well-developed fields at Karlsborg, Satenas, Soderhamm, Nykoping, Angelholm, Kalmar, Tullinge, Norrkoping and Ostersund. Moreover, provisional landing fields (along with support installations) are available on numerous national highways. There are 410 operationally ready combat aircraft. The outfitting of the air force with the SAB-37 "Viggen" supersonic fighter aircraft is finished. A multipurpose combat aircraft is being developed. A total of 28 squadrons are in service, including also fighter-bomber and fighter units as well as reconnaissance squadrons. Since there is no independent naval air force, the fighter squadrons also have sea combat missions to fulfill. In addition to the air force's own helicopter squadrons, there are equivalent units in the army and navy.

A fleet and coastal artillery form Sweden's navy, which has about 10,000 men in peacetime. Since the decommissioning of all larger vessels (up to and including destroyers and frigates), the surface forces now rely only on



seaworthy fast patrol boats with missile armament. The fleet has 34 fast patrol boats; six missile boats are under construction, and two command ships in addition. The RBS-15 (4.40 meters long, weighing 600 kilos, range 54 nautical miles) was developed domestically. Swedish submarines also meet high standards. Four A 17-class attack submarines (about 1,070 tons, wire-guided torpedos, 19-man crew) are under construction. Twelve submarines which were built between 1961 and 1980 are in service. The rescue submarine "Urf", which can dive to an ocean depth of 460 meters, merits attention as a special vessel. The minelayer fleet is also strongly developed; at the top are three large minelayers which can accommodate 110 mines each and which can be used as command ships. The coastal artillery has 13 small minelayers. There are 28 minesweepers in service; six more with plastic hulls (Landsort type, 350 tons) are to soon be delivered by the Karlskrona national shipyard. These minehunters are getting most modern detection systems. Four unmanned minesweepers with catamaran hulls sail by remote control.

### Total Defense

Sweden's defense policy concept is oriented to "total defense," which includes the whole society on all levels. Thus, military men cooperate closely with civil defense as well as with economic and psychological defense. The Defense Council coordinates all measures. It includes government representatives and the heads of the most important organizations. All leading civilian and military officials have to complete joint training at the National Defense Academy. The nerve center of all defense policy matters is the "People and Defense" central organization, which undertakes the mission of disseminating information on total defense, strengthening general defense interest and consolidating the will to resist. One of the major organizations in total defense is the Lotta Corps with its 65,000 women auxiliaries. The Swedish Red Cross combines 550,000 men and women. Furthermore, there are other volunteer organizations from the automobile corps to agricultural aid.

### Civil Defense

Sheltering and evacuation measures are the main pillars of the Swedish "Civilforsvaret" (civil defense), which can lean on a long tradition, for the Swedish Civil Defense Association was founded way back in 1937. The first air defense law went into effect on 1 July of the same year. The introduction of general civil defense duty came about in 1944; in 1967 the "General Directorate for Civil Defense" was removed from the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior and assigned to the Ministry of Defense. Civil defense is also divided into six civil defense regions, corresponding to the national military organization. At their top is always the civilian commander with his staff (equivalent to the German Regierungspräsident [main administrator of a bezirk/district]). He is responsible for coordinating all civil defense measures. Within these terms of reference he possesses authority to issue directives to the district governments. There are 24 district governments and 272 large municipalities.



Around four million people are covered by the stipulated evacuation measures, in order to take away any meaning from possible terror attacks on the civilian population from the outset. There are extensive shelters, which can meet the highest requirements, for the civil defense personnel remaining in the cities. Some of the collective shelters which accommodate 100,000 persons withstand excess pressure up to 10 atmospheres. Every multiple dwelling in all towns with more than 5,000 inhabitants contains an adequate standard shelter. Every Swedish citizen is in principle committed to self-defense. Every inhabitant receives from the state a protective mask with special filter. All specialties, from fire protection to rescue service, are represented in local civil defense. Twenty auxiliary corps with a total of 10,000 men are available in the supralocal civil defense service. The 13 largest cities are the locations of the corps (they each comprise 450 men with 100 special vehicles). A telecommunications team and support units form part of the corps headquarters. Two rescue companies, a fire-protection platoon, a supply and repair platoon, as well as an headquarters company ["Ordnungskompanie"], are combined in the corps. (It also assumes guard and traffic control tasks). Persons liable for military service, who have passed the age of 35 and were exempted from service in the armed forces, have to serve in the auxiliary corps.

There are 200,000 persons in the service of the local civilian defense organizations in peacetime. Another 50,000 perform work protection tasks. The portion of female assistants in local civilian defense is 20 percent of the overall size. Women have important tasks to perform in command service, in ABC protection and medical services. In accordance with the legal requirements on "weaponless service obligation", conscientious objectors have to perform substitute service lasting for 540 days.

The General Directorate for Civil Defense can have an annual budget of 155 million Swedish kronor available. Added to that are 30 million kronor for regional civil defense plans. Moreover, private parties spend around 110 million kronor annually for civil defense; around nine million kronor are allotted to the municipalities.

The emergency council, attached to the Ministry of Social Affairs, is responsible for all medical services tasks. The military medical service is also responsible for any people from the civilian population who might be wounded in a combat area. It takes care of transportation and maintenance. The joint care of civilian and military patients is basically assured. Medical specialists are liable to service until they pass 70 years of age. That also holds true for women. Large stores of medicines and medical material are maintained in all civil defense regions.

#### Defense Against Invasion

Maintaining peace is regarded as the primary mission of the armed forces. If that does not succeed, because an aggressor violates the sovereignty of Swedish territory "wherever it may be," then all measures for defense against invasion come into effect. Every Swede who is fit for military service and who is not committed to other important tasks within the framework of total

defense, has to take part militarily in the fight for the country's sovereignty. In such an event, the armed forces are under the orders of the commander-in-chief, who bears total responsibility vis-a-vis the government, while the commanders of the army, navy and air force are responsible for their components. This especially holds true for training and organization. The military commanders are in absolute charge of all military activities in their regions in the six military districts.

An independent air force command is responsible for the operational command of attack forces, while all fighter squadrons remain subordinate to the military commanders. There is no difference in this command practice between war and peacetime, so that an overall operable force of all military branches remains assured. Neither the forces in the field nor their command echelons have to adjust to new orders of battle. The basic staffs remain; they only need to be filled with personnel.

Territorial waters and airspace are subject to constant monitoring. The checking of the coastal zones -- and inshore waters in particular -- was intensified after the recent incidents with Soviet submarines. New electronic systems and special antisubmarine helicopters perform valuable service in doing this. The bulk of air force is in a permanent state of operational readiness. A staff officer at Tullinge base, near Stockholm, commented: "We can be in the air within a few minutes if the alert command comes." Certain contingents are kept in a state of high operational readiness in the case of coastal artillery and ground forces as well. This is particularly true of war and exercise units which are involved in the regular refresher training.

Mobilization measures can be put into effect quickly, as arms, ammunition, light and heavy combat gear of the war units are stored in numerous mobilization depots at various sites. The spacious accommodation almost completely precludes any disruptive actions worth mentioning. Armored, infantry and Norrland Brigades (with 5,000 to 6,000 men each) have high combat value in the formation of the ground forces. They are combined in divisions with the corresponding command, support and supply units when mobile defense is conducted.

The mission of the territorial combat units is to defend border and coastal sections, airfields, ports and command posts. Mobilization can be effected under the security screen of the immediately available home guard forces. All installations important to defense throughout the country are protected by local home guard units, which can also have heavy gear at their disposal.

#### Infrastructure and Budget

Large parts of the Swedish defense capability are accommodated in rock bunkers, which also offer secure protection against the use of nuclear weapons. The naval bases blasted into the steep cliffs of the Baltic coast deserve particular attention. They can accommodate vessels up to 3,000 tons. They are at the same time drydock and supply base with their own energy

sources. Air force operational bases also depend on rock structure: their hangars are located under meters-thick granite covers. All enterprises important to war could also be accommodated in underground galleries, so that their production capacities remain assured even if enemy counteraction should loom in the immediate vicinity of the installations. This is particularly true of aircraft industry plants, whose production lines were set up in rock caverns along with appropriate supplies of material.

The general directorate of national economic defense can likewise count on numerous protective installations in which extensive emergency stocks are stored, so that the population can also be taken care of over a rather long period of time. This general directorate acts as a central coordinating body which is responsible for the planning and preparation of provisioning and "preservation of vital services." The storing of provisions of all sorts (food, industrial raw materials, fuels) in all the military regions of the country guarantees that the defense capability is maintained even in the case of island positions. Oil supply plays a particular role in this, especially since Sweden does not have any kind of petroleum source of its own.

The armed forces components have on the average the following share in the defense budget: army = 38 percent, air force = 33 percent, navy = 16 percent, total materiel = 13 percent. The defense budget for 1983/84 ran to 20.5 billion kronor. That means: the portion of defense expenditures in the total budget amounted to seven percent (in 1977/78 it was still 10.1 percent). The change of trend to smaller budget appropriations occurred at the turn of 1979/80 under the protest of the commander-in-chief of the Swedish armed forces. Slight increases occurred last year as a result of Soviet behavior, and led to the quick procurement of some antisubmarine helicopters. Furthermore, there was an extensive modernization of the electronic monitoring system in areas near the coast. Also introduced were automatically working underwater hydrophones which transmit their location reports around the clock to operational combat centers.

One of the main missions of psychological defense is "to maintain and strengthen the will to resist in order to counteract enemy propaganda." The "Commission for Psychological Defense" is responsible for the planning and implementation; among its members are well-known personalities, including university professors, journalists and politicians. The aim of its work -- even under wartime conditions -- is mainly to assure factual, adequate and quick instruction of the population. The inclusion of the modern media plays a particular role in this. The function of the so-called "staff editor", a well-established newspaper editor with special knowledge from the area of defense policy, who has pledged to provide objective reporting and commentary of events in a state of defense, is unparalleled. Upon being inducted, he acquires the rank of a lieutenant colonel who is to perform exclusively journalistic tasks within the framework of total defense. This role of the "journalist soldier" is taken very seriously; it has stressed its importance in numerous planning exercises. "Good public relations work helps save human life," they say about this at the Ministry of Defense.

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ECONOMIC

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

# PRC SIGNS CONTRACT TO OPEN TRADE OFFICE IN FRANKFURT

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 4 Mar 86 p 12

[Unsigned article: "Chinese Foreign Trade Office Comes to Frankfurt"]

[Text] In the fall of 1986 at the latest the PRC will establish a foreign trade office in the rooms of the Frankfurt Chamber of Industry and Commerce, from which all of Western Europe is to be looked after. The planned branch is part of a comprehensive agreement between the China Council for the Promotion of the International Trade (CCPIT) and the city, which was signed over the weekend prior to the opening of the International Spring Fair.

The contract, which was signed by the president of the CCPIT, Jia Shi, and Chief Mayor Walter Wallmann, is aimed at a significant intensification of the economic relations between the PRC and the FRG, but especially the city of Frankfurt. Starting in 1988, the PRC is to be represented with a first presentation at the International Spring Fair. In response, the Chinese want to provide the Frankfurt fair "at the earliest time possible" the opportunity to appear at exhibitions in the PRC.

But, to start with, the CCPIT, which as official nonstate organization is comparable with the German Chamber of Industry and Commerce, will send five representatives to Frankfurt, who are to receive an about 6-month training in Western fair management and marketing from the fair company.

The signing of the contract was preceded by a five-day stay of a CCPIT delegation in Frankfurt. The guests visited the Deutsche Bundesbank (German Federal Bank), Hoechst AG, the Deutsche Bank (German Bank), and the Flughafen AG (Airport Corporation). In Wiesbaden they met with Hans Krollmann, the deputy minister president and finance minister. In the Frankfurt Chamber of Industry and Commerce, a presentation of the PRC economic policy took place, in which the delegation members held lectures, e.g., on important questions of industrial property rights and the patent system as well as also on the autonomy regulation of the various PRC provinces.

Chief Mayor Wallmann told journalists that the contract was "important for our city," for Frankfurt as the most important FRG economic center offers ideal conditions for deepening the economic relations with the PRC. In answer to the question whether other FRG cities had been under consideration as location



of the foreign trade office, CCPIT president Jia Shi said that his organization had always planned to establish only one branch, "namely in Frankfurt."

Jia Shi, who expressed thanks for the "friendly welcome" in Frankfurt, invited Wallmann, President of the Chamber of Industry and Commerce Messer, and the executive secretary of the Fair Company, Horst Stauber, for another visit to the PRC, during which a further intensification of the economic relations should be discussed.

Messer as well as Stauber stressed the growing importance of the Chinese market for Western Europe and the FRG. Messer said that the Chamber of Industry and Commerce makes its infrastructure available to FRG firms to facilitate establishing contacts. In the near future, the Chamber of Industry and Commerce will offer intensive courses in Chinese.

The president of the Chamber of Industry and Commerce estimated the value of the 1985 FRG goods exports to the PRC at DM 6.5 billion, while the imports were only around DM 3 billion. In 1985 the export grew 116 percent.

Executive Secretary Stauber said that the fair must see to it that firms have access with their technological know-how "where markets develop." The fair system in the PRC with its roughly 200 exhibitions annually which, however are "of varied quality," is extensively developed. The Frankfurt Fair must now "very carefully examine and then decide when and where we climb aboard."

Wallmann and Stauber gave a guarded answer to the question concerning the dispatch of Frankfurt Fair people to the PRC. The chief mayor said that this possibility will be "used when the time is ripe."

The head of the Frankfurt economic department, Mayor Hans-Juergen Moog, had not participated in the signing. Messer said Moog is to travel to the PRC this weekend.

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ECONOMIC

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

# PRC CANCELS AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE NUCLEAR REACTORS

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 10 Mar 86 p 164

[Unsigned article: "Painful Blow"; first paragraph is a SPIEGEL observation]

[Text] Since the German reactor builders did not get a chance in China, it is completely unclear what is going to happen with regard to Beijing's nuclear plans.

The 48 red files in room 2657 of the Beijing "Minzu" Hotel only have documentary value since the past week: The billion project of the FRG Kraftwerk Union (KWU), which is described there on thousands of pages in all technical details, has been canceled by China's economic planners because of a lack of capital and foreign exchange.

The thus far biggest German-Chinese nuclear project involved the turnkey construction of two nuclear power plants with 1000 megawatt each. The Chinese rejection is "a painful blow," according to Werner Henschel, KWU's Beijing representative. The Siemens subsidiary had already invested DM 10 million in the project.

Last summer, foreign ministers Wu Xueqian and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, watched by the satisfied smiles of Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Premier Zhao Ziyang, had agreed in Bonn that the Germans were to deliver a total of four nuclear reactors. Two years ago the FRG had concluded an "Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy." "Nuclear energy is safe, clean and a progressive energy source," Vice Premier Li Peng raved at that time.

Three to four large and medium-sized nuclear power plants were to be built by 1990; by the turn of the century Beijing wanted to have ten nuclear power plants with a total capacity of 10,000 megawatt. By the year 2000, the estimates went, nuclear power would constitute about 4 percent of the total Chinese consumption of electricity.

Following the latest decision, not much will be left of the ambitious plans. For the time being, only two nuclear power plants are to be built.

The Qinshan nuclear reactor in Chekiang Province is to go on stream with 300 megawatt in 1986. The power plant will supply especially Shanghai, the city of 10 million situated 126 km to the north. The Qinshan reactor, constructed according to the obsolete technology of Westinghouse, the U.S. power plant builder, is praised as the first domestic development. Also being continued is the construction of the Dayabay nuclear power plant in the southern province of Kuangtung, which, with a capacity of 1800 megawatt, will sell the power for good foreign exchange to nearby Hong Kong.

Here, too, KWU had submitted its bid--without success. The Chinese negotiated with the British and the French; the contract is not yet set. Early March, the rumor goes, the final award is to go to General Electric and Framatome.

The German power plant builders had negotiated with all the more determination in connection with the project that has now been stopped. At the end of 1985 delegations numbering up to 40 persons had discussed all details for the construction of the first two pressurized-water reactors with the Chinese in Beijing and in Wuxi near the planned location. As recently as early March, KWU chairman of the Board Hans Frewer negotiated in Beijing. "The technology was 100 percent clear," KWU representative Henschel said, "we had hopes."

There wasn't enough money, but that also did not appear to be an obstacle. The partners had built a golden bridge for the foreign-exchange-short Chinese from concessions and offers of barter transactions. The bundle, put together in such a complex way, provided that half of the 6 billion DM installation would be settled with delivery of metals. Moreover, the Germans wanted to purchase grain, petroleum and bituminous coal as well as 6,000 tons of natural uranium from the Chinese. Plans also called for the politically controversial final storage of 150 tons of spent fuel elements in China.

The fact that this deal did not materialize is connected with the worry of the Chinese about too many debts and political dependence. Beijing wants to consolidate the reform policy of "opening to the outside and revival within," which led to illegal imports of luxury goods, to economic criminality, corruption, and overheated market conditions, by a conservative budget policy.

Thus KWU chairman Frewer returned from Beijing merely with a noncommittal declaration of intention: Both sides want to continue the cooperation in the field of nuclear energy.

The Chinese did not even want to say whether or not the other planned nuclear reactors would be built at all. The question was still being considered, they said.

All interested parties for possible new large-scale nuclear projects are being put off to the next 5-year plan: They could perhaps get an opportunity then. But the plan does not start until the year 1991.

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ECONOMIC

ICELAND

'MUCH BETTER' OUTLOOK REPORTED FOR ECONOMY

Stockholm NORDISK KONTAKT in Norwegian No 3, 1986 pp 40-41

[Text] The prospects for the country's economy are now much better than was expected when the government formulated its policy during the preparation of the national budget for 1986 which was based on economic prognoses at the beginning of winter.

The improved prospects in the economy relate primarily to price increases for fishery products on the foreign markets, the likelihood of an increased catch this year and finally an oil price reduction.

Prime Minister Steingrímur Hermannsson (Progress Party) stated that there is now a possibility to reduce inflation considerably, so that it can perhaps be brought down to ten percent by the end of the year. Minister of Finance Þorsteinn Pálsson (Independence Party) agrees with this assessment even though he will not give a specific figure with regard to inflation. He pointed out that the public finances are in a very difficult situation, particularly because of the considerable deficit last year.

The Prime Minister pointed out among other things that the improved situation on the foreign markets is evidenced by the fact that the price for dried cod has increased by 16 percent, that the prices for frozen fish products in the United States have increased an average of five percent, and that fish prices also increased on Iceland's markets in Europe. He mentioned that these increases provide fish processing with more than a billion kroner annually. Finally, the sinking oil price will benefit the fishing boat owners and also different branches of the fish processing industry. Although it is still unclear how large the oil price reduction will be and how long it will remain so it was still assumed that the national economy will save approximately one billion kroner because of it.

Lower Interests

The Prime Minister also stated that expansion in the capital area has been reduced and that the wage drift has become less. As a consequence, it was predicted that the increase in the cost of living index in February will be

much lower than in the past month and will be still less in March. This will mean that the loan terms index is dropping quickly and likewise the nominal interest. This means a reduced repayment burden for business and industry.

The Prime Minister also pointed out that the position of industry was still weak, despite better prospects, something which can be seen, for instance, in the fact that the purchasing power of disposable incomes had increased by six percent last year.

#### Foreign Credits Out of the Question

During the debate in the Althing (Parliament) Steingrímur Hermannsson stated that the deficit in public finances last year will be covered by a loan which will be paid as such. There was no mention of taking foreign credits to cover the deficit in the public finances nor was there any mention of increasing taxes.

The Prime Minister said that there was great hope that it will be possible to avoid a national deficit this year.

The Prime Minister warned against putting forward unrealistic wage demands during the labor negotiations on the labor market. The opportunities available now must be used to reduce inflation. The government for its part was ready to facilitate the wage negotiations through efforts on its part to this end.

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